

# VII

## THE OTTOMAN TURKS AND THE CRUSADES, 1329–1451

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### *A. Turkish Settlement and Christian Reaction, 1329–1361*

**T**he fall of Acre in 1291 did not end the crusader peril for the Moslem world. Western Christendom was still unchallenged at sea in the eastern Mediterranean, and its forces had the advantage of being able to land at any time anywhere on the coasts, which therefore remained

General works on Ottoman history include Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches* (10 vols., Pest, 1827–1835; repr. Graz, 1963), largely superseded; Johann W. Zinkeisen, *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches in Europa* (7 vols., Hamburg, 1840–1863; repr. Darmstadt, 1963), still important for Ottoman relations with Europe; Nicola Jorga (Nicolae Iorga), *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches nach den Quellen dargestellt* (5 vols., Gotha, 1908–1913; repr. 1963), based on contemporary sources and archives, still essential; and İsmail H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi* (4 vols., Ankara, 1947–1959).

General histories relevant to the Ottomans are Wilhelm Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen-âge*, tr. Furcy Reynaud (2 vols., Leipzig, 1885–1886; repr. Leipzig, 1936, Amsterdam, 1967); Ludwig Pastor, *The History of the Popes from the Close of the Middle Ages*, tr. Frederick I. Antrobus; vols. I–VI (London, 1891 ff.); and Aziz S. Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages* (London, 1938).

Other histories relevant to our subject include Frederick W. Hasluck, *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans* (2 vols., Oxford, 1929); *Mélanges offerts à M. Nicolae Iorga par ses amis de France . . .* (Paris, 1933); Dorothy M. Vaughan, *Europe and the Turk: a Pattern of Alliances, 1350–1700* (Liverpool, 1954); and Franz Babinger, *Aufsätze und Abhandlungen zur Geschichte Südosteuropas und der Levante*, I, Südosteuropa (Schriften der Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, no. 3; Munich, 1962).

A long list of Ottoman documents published in various countries is contained in the introduction to Jan Reychman and Ananiasz Zajaczkowski, *Handbook of Ottoman-Turkish Diplomats*, tr. Andrew S. Ehrenkreutz, ed. Tibor Halasi-Kun (The Hague and Paris, 1968). Journals frequently publishing Ottoman documents include *Târih-i Osmânî encümeni mecmuasi* (Istanbul, 1908–1931), *Belleten* (Turkish Historical Society, Ankara; since 1937), *Tarih vesikalari* (Ankara, 1941–1961), *Tarih dergisi* (Faculty of Letters, University of Istanbul; since 1950), *Prilozi, za orijentalnu filologiju* (Orientalni Institut u Sarajevu; annually since 1950), *Monumenta turcica historiam Slavorum meridionalium illustrantia* (*idem*; since 1957), *Fontes historiae Bulgariae*, ser.

the boundaries between Islam and Christendom. The Christian's predominance on the sea was acknowledged by the Mamluks.<sup>1</sup> In fact, in the period after 1291 a blockade—ordered by pope Nicholas IV (1288-1292)—of Egypt, Syria, and Turkey seriously threatened to cut the supply lines of commodities vital to the Mamluks—arms, timber,

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XV-XVI: *Fontes turcici* . . . (Sofia, since 1964), and *Belgeler* (Turkish Historical Society, Ankara; since 1964). See also *Arşiv Kilavuzu* (2 vols., Istanbul, 1938-1940), incomplete guide to the collections of documents in the Topkapı Sarayı archives (TKS); M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, *XV-XVI. asırlarda Edirne ve Paşa Livâsi* (Istanbul, 1952), a collection of archival documents important for pious foundations in Rumelia, Ottoman biography, and finances; *Sûret-i defter-i sancak-i Arvanid*, ed. Halil Inalcik (Turkish Historical Society; Ankara, 1954), Ottoman survey book of Albania, dated 1432; and Ahmed Ferîdûn (Beg), ed., *Münşe'ât es-selâfin* (2 vols., Istanbul, 1858), critically analyzed by Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, *Recherches sur les actes des règnes des sultans Osman, Orkhan et Murad I* (Munich, 1967).

Western collections of documents are Ernest Charrière, ed., *Négociations de la France dans le Levant* (4 vols., Paris, 1848); Georg E. Müller, ed., *Documenti sulle relazioni delle città toscane coll' Oriente cristiano e coi turchi fino all' anno MDXXXI* (Documenti degli archivi toscani, no. 3; Florence, 1879); Vladimir Lamansky, ed., *Secrets d'état de Venise* (St. Petersburg, 1884; repr. New York, 1968); Iorga, *Notes et extraits pour servir à l'histoire des croisades au XV<sup>e</sup> siècle* (6 vols., Paris and Bucharest, 1899-1916); and Freddy Thiriet, ed., *Régestes des délibérations du sénat de Venise concernant la Roumanie* (3 vols., Paris and The Hague, 1958-1961).

Western memoirs of interest include G. Georgiades Arnakis, "Gregory Palamas among the Turks and Documents of his Captivity as Historical Sources," *Speculum*, XXXVI (1951), 104-118; *Reisen des Johannes Schiltberger* . . . , ed. Karl F. Neumann (Munich, 1859), tr. J. Buchan Telfer as *The Bondage and Travels of Johannes Schiltberger . . . in Europe, Asia, and Africa, 1396-1427*, with notes by Philipp Bruun (Hakluyt Series; London, 1879); he was captured in 1396 and served the sultan for six years; Bertrandon de la Brocquière, *Voyage d'Outremer*, ed. Charles Schefer (Paris, 1892); and "Donado da Lezze" (Giovanni-Maria Angiolello), *Historia turchesca (1300-1514)*, ed. Ion Ursu (Bucharest, 1910).

For Ottoman chroniclers see Babinger, *Die Geschichtsschreiber der Osmanen und ihre Werke* (Leipzig, 1927). The earliest surviving account of Ottoman history in Turkish is in Ahmedî's dedication of the *Iskendernâme* to the contender Suleiman (1402-1411); the text was last published by Nihal Atsız in *Osmanlı tarihleri* (Istanbul, 1949), pp. 1-35 (rhymed summary, with historical data too brief and too vague). Early Ottoman traditions, apparently composed in chronicle form under Orkhan (1326-1362), are lost, but their contents are partially known from compilations made under Bayazid II (1481-1512). 'Âshîk Pasha-zâde summarized them in faithful detail in his *Tevârîkh-i Âl-i 'Othmân*, ed. Atsız as *Âşîkpaşazâde tarihi* (Istanbul, 1949), pp. 79-318; tr. Richard F. Kreutel, *Vom Hirtenzelt zur hohen Pforte* (Vienna and Cologne, 1959); legendary folk tales are mixed in with genuine historical accounts, necessitating critical use of this important source.

The second and third compilations—Rûhî (or Pseudo-Rûhî) and the anonymous chronicler—used some of the same sources as the first. For discussion see Inalcik, "The Rise of Ottoman Historiography," in *Historians of the Middle East*, ed. Bernard Lewis and Peter M. Holt (London, 1962), pp. 152-167; Victor L. Ménage, "The Beginnings of Ottoman Historiography," *ibid.*, pp. 168-179; and *idem*, *Neşrî's History of the Ottomans: the Sources and Development of the*

1. David Ayalon, "Bahriyya," *Encyclopaedia of Islâm*, 2nd ed., I (Leyden, 1960), 945-946; *idem*, "The Wâfidiya in the Mamluk Kingdom," *Islamic Culture*, XXX (1951), 89-104; Inalcik, "The Rise of the Turcoman Maritime Principalities in Anatolia, Byzantium, and Crusades," *Byzantinische Forschungen*, IX (1985), 179-217.

iron, and most important of all, slaves. Since these materials and slaves were imported from Turkey or through the Aegean Sea from the Black Sea, the islands of the eastern Mediterranean acquired major importance in western strategy. As a result of this new situation, the *uj* (frontier) Turcomans in Anatolia, dependent on the export to Egypt of

*Text* (London, 1964). The section on Ottoman history added by Enverî to *Le Destân d'Umur Pacha* (see below) is an original compilation of the earlier chronicles which sheds new light on various controversial points.

On the Turkish principalities in Anatolia see Uzunçarşılı, *Anadolu beylikleri*, 2nd ed. (Ankara, 1969), a general survey; Paul Wittek, *Das Fürstentum Mentese: Studien zur Geschichte Westkleinasiens im XIII.-XV. Jahrhundert* (Istanbul, 1934); Barbara Flemming, *Landschaftsgeschichte von Pamphylien, Pisidien und Lykien im Spätmittelalter* (Wiesbaden, 1964); Mustafa C. Varlık, *Germiyan-oğulları tarihi, 1300-1429* (Ankara, 1974); Tuncer Baykara, *Denizli tarihi* (Istanbul, 1969); Himmet Akin, *Aydın-oğulları tarihi hakkında bir araştırma* (Istanbul, 1946); Claude Cahen, "Pour l' Histoire des turcomanes d'Asie mineure au XIIIe siècle," *Journal asiatique*, CCXXXIX (1951), 325-354; Adnan S. Erzi, "Akkoyunlu ve Karakoyunlu tarihi hakkında araştırmalar," *Belleten*, XVIII (1954), 179-221; John Woods, *The Akkoyunlu: Clan, Confederation, Empire* (Minneapolis and Chicago, 1976); Faruk Sümer, *Kara Koyunlular*, I (Ankara, 1967); Şehabeddin Tekindağ, "Son Osmanlı-Karaman münasebetleri hakkında araştırmalar," *Tarih dergisi* (1963), 43-76; and M. Yaşar Yücel, *Kadı Burhâneddin Ahmed ve devleti, 1344-1398* (Ankara, 1970).

For a comprehensive analysis of conditions in Selchükid Anatolia and the frontier areas see the pioneering works of Mehmed Fuad Köprülü, "Bemerkungen zur Religionsgeschichte Kleinasiens," *Mitteilungen zur osmanischen Geschichte*, I (1921-1922), 203-222; "Köprülüzüade Mehmed Fuad's Werk über die ersten Mystiker in der türkischen Literatur," *Körösi Csoma Archiv*, II (1927-1932), 281-310, 406-422; *Les Origines de l'empire ottoman* (Paris, 1935); and "Osmanlı imparatorluğunun etnik menşei meselesi," *Belleten*, VII (1943), 219-303. Köprülü's work has been expanded by Friedrich Giese, "Das Problem der Entstehung des osmanischen Reiches," *Zeitschrift für Semitistik und verwandte Gebiete*, II (1924), 246-271; by Franz G. Taeschner, "Beiträge zur Geschichte der Achis in Anatolien," *Islamica*, IV (1929), 1-47, and *idem*, "Aḳḳī," in *Encyclopaedia of Islām*, rev. ed., I (Leyden, 1960; repr. 1967), 321-323; and by Wittek, "Deux chapitres de l'histoire des Turcs de Roum," *Byzantion*, XI (1936), 285-319, and *idem*, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1958). See also Ernst Werner, *Die Geburt einer Grossmacht: die Osmanen (1300-1481), ein Beitrag zur Genesis des türkischen Feudalismus* (Berlin, 1966).

On the struggle for the Aegean see Max Silberschmidt, *Das orientalische Problem zur Zeit der Entstehung des türkischen Reiches nach venezianischen Quellen, 1381-1400* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1923); Irène Mélikoff-Sayar, tr., *Le Destân d'Umur Pacha: Düstûrnâme-i Enverî* (Bibliothèque byzantine, Documents, no. 2; Paris, 1954); Paul Lemerle, *L'Émirat d'Aydın, Byzance et l'Occident: Recherches sur "La geste d'Umur Pacha"* (Bibliothèque byzantine, Études, no. 2; Paris, 1957), basic for 1330-1348; and Angeliki E. Laiou, "Marino Sanudo Torsello, Byzantium and the Turks," *Speculum*, XLV (1970), 374-392.

On Timur, the Ottomans, and the west see M. Halil Yinanç, "Bayazid I," *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, II (Istanbul, 1943), 369-371; Marie M. Alexandrescu-Dersca, *La Campagne de Timur en Anatolie (1402)* (Bucharest, 1942), reviewed by Inalcik in *Belleten*, XI (1947), 341-345; Zeki V. Togan, "Timurs Osteuropapolitik," *ZDMG*, CVIII-2 (1958), 279-298; Tekindağ, *Berkuk devrinde Memlûk sultanlığı* (Istanbul, 1961); Yücel, "Timur tehlikesi," *Belleten*, XXXVII (1973), 159-190; and Anatoly P. Novosel'tsev, "On the Historical Evolution of Timur," *Voprosy isotorii*, II (1973), 100-115.

No systematic and objective history of Ottoman-Byzantine relations exists. For partial treatments see Oskar Halecki, *Un Empereur de Byzance à Rome: Vingt ans de travail pour l'union des églises et pour la défense de l'empire d'Orient, 1355-1375* (Warsaw, 1930; repr. London, 1972); Peter Charanis, "Internal Strife at Byzantium during the XIVth Century," *Byzantion*, XV

their timber and slaves, were brought into a closer relationship with the Mamluks.

One crucial development in the ensuing period of struggle between Islam and Christendom was the rise in the first half of the fourteenth century of Turkish navies manned by sea ghazis,<sup>2</sup> who were later to

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(1940), 208-230; *idem*, "The Strife among the Palaeologi and the Ottoman Turks, 1370-1402," *Byzantion*, XVI (1942-1943), 286-314; George Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State*, tr. Joan M. Hussey (London, 1956); John W. Barker, *Manuel II Palaeologus, 1391-1425: a Study in Late Byzantine Statesmanship* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1969); Apostolos E. Bakalopoulos, *Origins of the Greek Nation, 1204-1461*, tr. Ian Motes, vol. I (New Brunswick, 1970); and Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins: the Foreign Policy of Andronicus II, 1282-1328* (Cambridge, Mass., 1972).

Byzantine chroniclers are indispensable for Ottoman history before 1451; John Cantacuzenus's memoirs, *Historiarum libri IV*, ed. Ludwig Schopen (*CSHB*, 3 vols., Bonn, 1828-1832; also in *PG*, vol. CLIII), are analyzed by Valentin Parisot, *Cantacuzène, homme d'état et historien* (Paris, 1845), and by Lemerle, *L'Émirat*, in the light of Nicephorus Gregoras (1290-1360) and other contemporary sources. For the period 1360-1400 no Byzantine chronicle comparable to these two exists. For 1400-1462 the most important source is Ducas (Doukas), *Historia byzantina*, ed. Immanuel Bekker (*CSHB*, Bonn, 1834; also in *PG*, vol. CLVII), tr. Harry J. Magoulias as *Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks (Historia turco-byzantina, 1341-1462)* (Detroit, 1975). Ducas should be supplemented by George Sphrantzes, *Chronicon minus*, ed. Bekker (*CSHB*, Bonn, 1838; also in *PG*, vol. CLVI), tr. Marios Philippides as *The Fall of the Byzantine Empire* (Amherst, 1980). For 1420-1463 see also Laonicus Chalcocondylas, *Historiarum demonstrationes*, ed. Eugen Darkó (2 vols. in 3, Budapest, 1922-1927; cf. Akdes Nimet (Kurat), *Die türkische Prosopographie bei Laonikos Chalkokondyles* (Hamburg, 1933). Charles (Karl) Hopf, *Chroniques gréco-romanes inédites ou peu connues* (Berlin, 1873; repr. 1966), is still useful.

For the Ottomans and the Balkans a systematic bibliography is the *Bibliographie d'études balkaniques* (Sofia, since 1966). Each Balkan country publishes a journal devoted to Balkan studies: *Balkan Studies* (Salonika, since 1960), *Revue des études sud-est européennes* (Bucharest, since 1962), *Studia albanica* (Tirana, since 1963), *Études balkaniques* (Sofia, since 1964), *Balkanica* (Belgrade, since 1969), and *Güney-Doğu Avrupa araştırmaları* (Istanbul, since 1972). See also Constantin Jireček, *Geschichte der Bulgaren* (Prague, 1876); Stanoje Stanojević, "Die Biographie Stefan Lazarević von Konstantin dem Philosophen als Geschichtsquelle," *Archiv für slavische Philologie*, XVIII (1896), 409-472, source tr. Matthias Braun as *Lebensbeschreibung des Despoten Stefan Lazarević . . .* (Göttingen, 1956); Stojan Novaković, *Die Serben und Türken*, tr. K. Kezdimirović (Semlin, 1897); Ferdinand Šišić, "Die Schlacht bei Nikopolis (25 September 1396)." *Wissenschaftliche Mittheilungen aus Bosnien und der Hercegovina*, VI (1898), 291-327; Jireček, *Geschichte der Serben* (2 vols., Gotha, 1911-1918; repr. Amsterdam, 1967); Constantin Marinescu (Marinesco), "Alphonse V, roi d'Aragon et de Naples, et l'Albanie de Scanderbeg," *Mélanges de l'École roumaine en France*, I (Paris, 1923), 7-135; Ilie Minea, "Vlad Dracul și vremea sa," *Cercetari istorice*, II (1923), 1-135; Atiya, *The Crusade of Nicopolis* (London, 1934); Francis Pall, "Marino Barlezio: uno storico humanista," *Mélanges d'histoire générale*, II (Cluj, 1938), 135-318; Braun, "Türkenherrschaft und Türkenkampf bei den Balkanslaven," *Welt als Geschichte*, III-IV (1940), 124-139; Georg Städtmüller, *Geschichte Südosteuropas* (Munich, 1950); Ivan Dujčev, "La Conquête turque et la prise de Constantinople dans la littérature slave contemporaine," *Byzantinoslavica*, XIV (1953), 14-54; XVI (1955), 318-329; and XVII (1956), 276-340; Branislav Djurdjev, "Bosna," in *Encyclopaedia of Islām*, rev. ed., I, 1261-1275; Inalcik, "Arnawutluk," *ibid.*, I, 650-658; *idem*, "Iskender Beg," *ibid.*, IV-1 (1973-1975), 138-140; Bariša Krekić, *Dubrovnik (Raguse) et le Levant au moyen âge* (Paris and The Hague, 1961); Giuseppe Valentini, ed., *Acta albanica veneta, saeculorum XIV et XV* (20 vols., Munich, 1967-1974); and Inalcik,

2. Al-'Umarī, *Masālik al-abṣār fī mamālik al-amṣār*, ed. Taeschner (Leipzig, 1929), pp. 43-52.

form the nucleus of Ottoman sea power. The emergence of these sea ghazis can be seen as a continuation of the Turkish expansion movement toward the west. Turkish azebs (from Arabic *'azab*, bachelor, youth), the fighting men on these flotillas, were identical in origin, motivation, and organization to the frontier ghazis. One of the first results of this new set of circumstances was a northward shift of the main field of action, eventually leaving Egypt and Syria out of the actual struggle.

The Turkish conquest of western Anatolia from the Byzantines in

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"L'Empire ottoman," (*Actes du premier Congrès international des études balkaniques et sud-est européennes . . . [Sofia, 1966]*, Éditions de l'Académie bulgare des sciences, 1967-1971, III (*Histoire*, 1969).

On Hungary, Austria, and the Ottomans see Josef von Aschbach, *Geschichte Kaiser Sigmunds* (4 vols., Hamburg, 1838); Alfons Huber, "Ludwig I. von Ungarn und die ungarischen Vassallenländer," *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte*, LXVI (1884), 1-44, printed separately (Vienna, 1885); Leopold Kupelwieser, *Die Kämpfe Ungarns mit der Osmanen bis zur Schlacht bei Mohács, 1526*, 2nd ed. (Vienna, 1899); Gustav Beckmann, *Der Kampf Kaiser Sigmunds gegen die werdende Weltmacht der Osmanen, 1392-1437* (Gotha, 1902); Iorga, "Du Nouveau sur la campagne turque de Jean Hunyadi en 1448," *Revue historique du sud-est européen*, III (1926), 13-27; and Lajos Elekes, *Hunyadi* (in Hungarian; Budapest, 1952).

On the papacy, Italy, and the Ottomans the basic reference is now Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant, 1204-1571* (4 vols., Philadelphia, 1976-1985). Older works still useful include Lodovico Sauli, *Storia della colonia dei genovesi in Galata* (2 vols., Turin, 1831); Samuele Romanin, *Storia documentata di Venezia* (10 vols., Venice 1853-1861; repr. 1925); Iorga, *Philippe de Mézières, 1327-1405* (Paris, 1896); Camillo Manfroni, *La Battaglia di Gallipoli e la politica veneta-turca* (Venice, 1902); *idem*, *Storia della marina italiana dal trattato di Ninfeo alla caduta di Costantinopoli* (3 vols., Leghorn, 1902-1903); Francesco Cerone, "La Politica orientale di Alfonso di Aragona," *Archivio storico per le provincie napoletane*, XXVII (1902), 3-93, 380-456, 555-634, 774-852, and XXVIII (1903), 154-212; and William Miller, *The Latins in the Levant: a History of Frankish Greece (1204-1566)* (London, 1908; repr. 1964).

More recent works include Pall, "Ciriaco d'Ancona e la crociata contro i Turchi," *AR*, BSH, XX (1938), 9-60; Babinger, "Le Vicende veneziane nella lotta contro i Turchi durante il secolo XV," *Civiltà veneziana del quattrocento* (Florence, 1957), pp. 51-73; Anthony Luttrell, "The Crusade in the Fourteenth Century," *Europe in the Late Middle Ages*, ed. John R. Hale, John R. L. Highfield, and Beryl Smalley (London, 1965), pp. 122-154; Eugene L. Cox, *The Green Count of Savoy* (Princeton, 1967); Paolo Preto, *Venezia e i Turchi* (Florence, 1975); Michel Balard, *La Romanie génoise (XIIIe-début du XVe siècle)* (2 vols., Rome and Genoa, 1978); and "Le Relazioni tra l'Italia e la Turchia," special issue of *Il Veltro*, XXIII/2-4 (1979).

On the crusade of Varna see the anonymous chronicle, *Gazavât-i Sultân Murâd b. Mehemed Han*, ed. Inalcik and M. Oğuz (Ankara, 1978); Lajos Fekete, "Das Fethnâme über die Schlacht bei Varna," *Byzantinoslavica*, XIV (1953), 258-270; O. Székely, "Hunyadi János első török hadjáratai (1441-1444)," *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények*, XX-XXII (1919-1921), 1-64; Pall, "Autour de la Croisade de Varna: la question de la paix de Szeged et de sa rupture (1444)," *AR*, BSH, XXII (1941), 144-158; Halecki, *The Crusade of Varna: Discussion of Controversial Problems* (New York, 1943); and Jan Dąbrowski, "L'Année 1444," *Bulletin international de l'Académie polonaise des sciences et des lettres: Classe d'histoire et de philosophie*, supp. no. 6 (Cra-cow, 1951).

For the Ottoman adoption of Hussite *wagenburg* tactics see M. Wulf, *Die hussitische Wagenburg* (Berlin, 1889); Jan Durdik, *Hussitisches Heerwesen* (Berlin, 1961); and *Gazavât-i Sultân Murâd*, ed. Inalcik and Oğuz.

the second half of the thirteenth century had not caused serious alarm in the west, since western Christendom was then primarily concerned with the fate of the last remnants of the crusader states on the Syrian coast and with the restoration of the Latin empire in Constantinople. The Turkish warrior-nomads had been active on the Selchükid-Byzantine frontiers for a long period of time without making a determined attempt at invasion, and, in any case, their repulsion was thought not to be a difficult task for the Byzantine state. In the crusade projects drawn up around 1300 the Turkish invasion of western Anatolia was regarded as a minor question to be dealt with by the crusader army on its way to Palestine.

Today most historians try to explain the collapse of Byzantine rule in western Anatolia by focusing on certain "unwise" policies of the Byzantine government. But it seems clear that the fundamental reason for the collapse is the mass migration of the Turcomans (Türkmen) westward in the last decades of the thirteenth century, an event reminiscent of the first Turkish invasion of Anatolia after the battle of Manzikert (1071). Christian Europe became aware of the significance of the Turkish advance only in the early fourteenth century, when Latin possessions and commercial traffic came increasingly under attack by the Turcoman ghazis, fighters for Islamic holy war (*jihād*) operating on the Aegean Sea. Thus, with Islam issuing a direct challenge to Europe on the sea, an entirely new situation arose in the long struggle between Islam and Christendom.

The gravity of the threat on the Aegean was clearly seen by Marino Sanudo "Torsello" (1270-1337). A tireless propagandist for a general crusade against Egypt since 1306, Sanudo had by 1320 developed the view that the first objective of a crusade should be the expulsion of the Turks from the Aegean.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, coupled with an effective military organization and with the revival of the holy war, the mass movement of the Turks toward the west assumed, after the first successes, such a magnitude that there was soon talk of a Turkish peril for all Europe.

When a new Turkey with great demographic potential and a heightened holy war ideology emerged in the old Selchükid (Seljuk) frontier zone, east of a line from the mouth of the Dalaman (Indos) river to that of the Sakarya (Sangarius), a thrust by this explosive frontier society against the neighboring Byzantine territory in western Anatolia was almost inevitable.

3. Laiou, "Marino Sanudo Torsello," p. 380. Cf. Atiya, "The Crusade in the Fourteenth Century," in volume III of the present work, p. 10.

This westward expansion had been accomplished in four stages: the seasonal transhumance movements of Turcoman nomadic groups into the Byzantine coastal plains; the organization of small raiding groups under ghazi leaders, mostly of tribal origin, for booty raids or for employment as mercenaries; the emergence of successful leaders capable of bringing local chiefs together as their clients, for conquest and for the establishment of *beyliks* (principalities) in the conquered lands, on the model of the principalities founded in the old Selchükid frontier zone; and finally, the involvement of these ghazi beyliks, with definite political and economic goals, in the regional struggle for supremacy in the Aegean and in the Balkans.

In the 1320's and 1330's, Turkish groups acting as ghazi raiding parties or mercenary companies joined together under the command of powerful leaders such as Umur Pasha (1334–1348) of the Aydin dynasty or Orkhan (1326–1362) and his eldest son, Suleiman Pasha, of the Ottoman house; only through them could the Byzantines hope to acquire sizable mercenary aid from Anatolia. Through alliance with the Byzantines the Turcoman begs in turn could provide employment and booty for the ever-growing number of ghazis gathering under their banners for raids on an increasingly larger scale in the Balkans. At this stage neither Umur nor Orkhan was interested in conquest or settlement of overseas lands.

Between 1329 and 1337, while Umur was launching his spectacular sea expeditions from Smyrna, the Ottomans, fighting against the Byzantines in northwestern Anatolia, were also making important conquests, including Nicaea on March 2, 1330, and Nicomedia in 1337. Their first significant advances came during the period 1329–1334, when Umur too was engaged in hostilities with the Byzantines. Though our sources give no hint of an alliance or actual coöperation between Umur and Orkhan, circumstances made them natural allies in this period, and again from 1342 to 1346, when Umur was giving strong support to John VI Cantacuzenus against his rivals in Constantinople.<sup>4</sup> The efforts of the latter to secure military aid from Orkhan failed; instead, with the assistance of Ottoman troops, Cantacuzenus was able to seize all the Black Sea ports except Sozopolis from the hands of his enemies. The marriage of his daughter Theodora to Orkhan in June 1346 cemented Cantacuzenus's alliance with the Ottoman principality, by

4. For this period see Lemerle, *L'Émirat d'Aydin*, pp. 145–174, 204–217. Lemerle relies on the translation into French by Mélikoff-Sayar, *Le Destân d'Umur Pacha*. Cf. Luttrell, "The Hospitallers at Rhodes, 1306–1421," in volume III of the present work, pp. 293–295; Inalcik, *op. cit.* (in note 1, above).

then the strongest of the Turcoman states. Once in full power in Constantinople (February 3, 1347), however, Cantacuzenus appeared to turn to a policy of coöperation with the Latins against the Turks, offering in 1348 to continue the Byzantine alliance with pope Clement VI (1342-1352) and Humbert II of Viennois (d. 1355).<sup>5</sup> This policy, however, was intended primarily to thwart the plans of Stephen IV Dushan, the Serbian king (1331-1355), who in 1345 had proclaimed himself "emperor of the Serbs and Greeks".

By 1347 Dushan's advances had become a major threat to the existence of the empire, as he was seeking Venetian assistance in the conquest of Constantinople.<sup>6</sup> Under the circumstances Cantacuzenus had to maintain close relations with the Ottomans, the only source from which he could expect substantial military aid; it was this situation that led to the Turkish settlement in Europe.

While the Turks of Aydin were effectively neutralized by the capture of the castle at Smyrna (Izmir), which the pope had decided to keep as a check upon them, the Ottoman Turks were becoming more and more involved in Balkan affairs, especially after they had firmly established themselves in Karasi, facing Thrace.<sup>7</sup> Umur's death in the spring of 1348 led to Aydin's decline as a threat to the Latins, but it also served to strengthen the position of the Ottomans, bringing under their banner an increasing number of *ghazis*. The leaders of the *ghazā* in Karasi appear to have collaborated with the Ottomans to bring about the union of the two states, and the Ottoman conquests in Thrace in the next decade were to be basically the work of *ghazis* from Karasi.

Immediately after the first conquests in Karasi, the area was made into an Ottoman *uj* (frontier) sanjak with Biga (Pegae) as its center, under the leadership of Suleiman Pasha, an ardent advocate of frontier warfare (*ghazā*), who was to become responsible for the shaping of Ottoman western policy. The new frontier sanjak had important sea bases at Lampsacus (Lapseki), Aydinjik (near Cyzicus), and Kemer (Keramides?), which from Byzantine times had sheltered corsairs who preyed on the merchant ships traveling between the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. In 1352 the principal Ottoman army was to embark from Kemer for their conquest of the isthmus of the Gallipoli peninsula.

5. See Raymond J. Loenertz, "Ambassades grecs auprès du Pape Clément VI (1348)," in *Orientalia Christiana periodica*, XIX (1953), 178-196; Lemerle, *L'Émirat*, pp. 224-226; Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, I, 212-215. Cf. Deno Geanakoplos, "Byzantium and the Crusades, 1261-1354," in volume III of the present work, pp. 63-65.

6. Jireček, *Geschichte der Serben*, I, 386-387, 396; Thiriet, *Régestes*, I, no. 189.

7. Lemerle, *L'Émirat*, pp. 219-222. The area around Pergamum (Bergama) and Troy facing the Dardanelles appears to have been organized as a frontier sanjak under a branch of the Karasi dynasty, first under Yakhshi Beg and then under Suleiman Beg.



We cannot tell with certainty which of the Turkish groups active in Thrace in this period came from the Ottoman dominions. On two occasions Byzantine historians speak specifically of Ottoman armies sent over to Thrace: the first came shortly after the meeting of Orkhan with Cantacuzenus at Scutari (Üsküdar) in 1346, when Suleiman Pasha, at the head of an army of ten thousand, was sent to Thrace against the Serbs. Evidently the Ottoman soldiery engaged rather in the usual booty raids, and soon returned home to Anatolia. In 1350, when Stephen Dushan threatened Thessalonica, a second large Ottoman army, reportedly twenty thousand in number, again under Suleiman Pasha, proceeded along the Aegean coast of Thrace together with the Byzantine forces under Matthew Cantacuzenus, son of John VI, while John VI Cantacuzenus and co-emperor John V Palaeologus sailed by sea to Thessalonica. Before the armies reached their objective, however, Orkhan stated that he was threatened by Turkish emirs, his neighbors in Anatolia, and called Suleiman back; after a raid into Bulgaria, the latter returned.

A crisis parallel to that of Byzantium also helped to make possible the Ottoman passage into Europe: the conflict between Genoa and Venice over the Byzantine heritage in the eastern Aegean. The Venetian-Genoese war (1350-1355), which caused the dissolution of the anti-Turkish coalition in the Aegean, gave rise to a new power alignment in the area. While the Venetians moved closer to Cantacuzenus and king Peter IV of Aragon-Catalonia (1336-1387) and his Catalans in the Levant, the Genoese allied themselves with the leading Turkish emirs, Kihdr (Hizir) Beg of Aydin and the Ottoman Orkhan. During the war the Turkish emirs provided the Genoese not only with badly needed provisions but also with military aid. Cantacuzenus, always hoping that Byzantine sovereignty might be reestablished in Chios and the two Phocaeas, then in Genoese hands, actually concluded a treaty of alliance with Venice in May 1351. Venice promised to mediate between the emperor and Stephen Dushan.

Both the Venetians and the Genoese sought the alliance of the Ottomans in this all-out war for the control of the waterways to the Black Sea. The Ottomans controlled the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus, and their aid to Pera was of crucial importance. Despite the solicitations of the Venetians and Cantacuzenus, the Ottomans chose to support the Genoese, a logical policy for them to follow since the Venetians were known to be the principal contender against Turkish westward expansion in this period, while the Genoese showed themselves to be generally coöperative. Apparently the Genoese-Ottoman treaty was the first treaty concluded between the Ottomans and a western nation.

(The document itself is not extant, and its exact date is not known.) During the war the Ottomans supplied the Genoese with one thousand archers, who were stationed at Pera and on the Genoese ships.<sup>8</sup>

The Ottomans apparently took part in the defense of Pera in the summer of 1351, when, following a surprise attack by the Venetians, the city was besieged by joint Venetian-Byzantine forces. Orkhan himself, at the head of his army, arranged an interview with the Genoese admiral Paganino Doria at Chalcedon to the south of the Bosphorus.<sup>9</sup> The major clash between the two parties took place on the Bosphorus on February 15, 1352. Judging from a Genoese document of a later date, praising the role Orkhan played on the occasion,<sup>10</sup> he must have taken an active part in this crucial battle between the Genoese armada under Doria and the allied fleets of Venice and Aragon. Abandoned by his allies and surrounded in Constantinople by victorious Ottoman and Genoese forces, Cantacuzenus had to accept a treaty of peace with Doria, signed May 6, 1352, which forbade the use of Greek territories or seamen by the Venetians against the Genoese, and recognized the Genoese possession of Pera within its new limits.<sup>11</sup>

Thanks to Genoese assistance, the Ottomans were provided with a safe means of crossing the Straits whenever they wished, aboard Genoese ships, while the Genoese in turn secured Ottoman protection for Pera and commercial privileges within Ottoman dominions. A first example of this coöperation occurred in 1352 when the Ottoman forces under Suleiman and his brother Khalil were ferried across the Bosphorus on Genoese ships for raids into Greek territories in Thrace.<sup>12</sup> Commercial ties between Pera and Bursa (Brusa) would be of considerable benefit to the development of both cities. Bursa was soon to become a terminus for caravans bringing silk from Iran, and the silk trade was one of the sources of Pera's renewed prosperity. Pera, in turn, was to be the Ottomans' market for obtaining western commodities, principally the fine woolens much in demand in the Near East.

In 1352 the Ottomans were still at war with Byzantium. Their collaboration with the Genoese in the siege of Constantinople, coupled with the invasion of Thrace by an Ottoman army under Suleiman, must

8. Camillo Manfroni, "Le Relazioni fra Genova, l'impero bizantino e i Turchi," *Atti della Società ligure di storia patria*, XXVIII (ser. 3, I; 1896), 710-713, cited by Iorga, *Geschichte*, I, 192; Heyd, tr. Raynaud, I, 506.

9. Iorga, "Latins et Grecs d'Orient et l'établissement des Turcs en Europe," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, XV (1906), 211.

10. Luigi T. Belgrano, "Prima serie di documenti riguardanti le colonie di Pera," *Atti della Società ligure*, XIII (1877-1884), 127, 129, cited by Heyd, tr. Raynaud, I, 507.

11. Documents published by Sauli, *Della Colonia dei genovesi in Galata*, II, 216.

12. Iorga, *Geschichte*, I, 192.

have been decisive in inducing Cantacuzenus to abandon his western allies. He hastened to make peace with the Ottomans, still with the idea that he could use them as he had Umur's ghazis, to further his own interests in protecting the empire against Stephen Dushan and in replacing the Palaeologi on the Byzantine throne. Dushan, in turn, chose to protect John V Palaeologus (1341/1391) in the civil war which broke out again in Thrace in the summer of 1352 and lasted through the summer of 1356. Allied to the Venetians in return for a promise to relinquish the island of Tenedos, John V mobilized a Serbian-Bulgarian army in Demotica to set out against Matthew Cantacuzenus in Adrianople. Suddenly an Ottoman army of ten thousand men under Suleiman arrived to oppose the allied army, and inflicted a crushing defeat on it at Pythion in October 1352.<sup>13</sup> This was the first Ottoman victory over the Serbs, who were to be until 1389 the major contenders against Ottoman expansion into the Balkans.

John V Palaeologus fled, and took shelter at Tenedos under Venetian protection, finally leaving Cantacuzenus free to claim the throne. Suleiman then entered Adrianople as an ally of Cantacuzenus, which the Ottoman epic fancies as the first "conquest" of the city by the Ottomans. Suleiman returned home after this meeting, but he left behind a small Turkish force that took up winter quarters in a site reportedly assigned by Cantacuzenus, at Tzympe (Jinbi), a small fortress on the coast north of Gallipoli. As a bridgehead on the western shores of the Marmara sea, the occupation of Tzympe was important as a harbinger of the Turkish settlement in Europe to come.

The historian Nicephorus Gregoras asserted that Cantacuzenus himself gave the Turks the fortress, and that they lived in Tzympe with their families under a qadi with their own mosque, forming a military colony in the pay of Cantacuzenus.<sup>14</sup> The latter, in reply, tried to absolve himself of responsibility for the incident by saying that the fortress was taken by the Ottoman Turks during the events of 1351-1352.<sup>15</sup> In Ottoman tradition Tzympe was captured by surprise by a small group (seventy men) with the aid of a native Greek.<sup>16</sup> However that may be,

13. Jireček, *loc. cit.* The Ottoman tradition on Suleiman's victory over the Serbs is to be found in Pseudo-Rûhî (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. Marsh 313), fols. 21-22; on this source see Inalcik, "The Rise of Ottoman Historiography," pp. 152-167.

14. Iorga, *Geschichte*, I, p. 194.

15. Iorga, "Latins," p. 213. The Venetian accusation that the Genoese with two small ships took the Turks across the Straits, and thus were responsible for their settlement in Europe (Heyd, *op. cit.*, II, 44-45) must have some truth in it. We know that Suleiman's forces were transported to Thrace by the Genoese in 1351.

16. *Düstûrnâme-i Enverî*, ed. Yinanç (Istanbul, 1928), p. 82.

once settled in Tzympe<sup>17</sup> Eje Beg, accompanied by Melik Beg, the converted son of Asen, Greek lord of Gallipoli, ferried fresh forces amounting in a few days to two thousand men from the Anatolian to the European coast on Greek ships found in the port of Tzympe. Asen, failing to overcome them, shut himself in his castle. In Biga Suleiman Pasha put the new frontier thus established around Tzympe under the command of Eje Beg, who, it seems, had formulated the original plan to organize the ghazis under the protection of the Ottoman state into a permanent settlement on the European side of the Dardanelles.<sup>18</sup>

A new and decisive development in the settlement of Turks in Thrace was, according to the Ottoman sources, the transfer under Suleiman Pasha himself of a regular army, three thousand in number, by ship from Kemer to Kozlu-Dere, a valley near Tzympe that led up to the Hexamilion on the heights dominating the isthmus of the Gallipoli peninsula. Suleiman set up headquarters at Bolayır on the heights of the isthmus and organized his ghazis into two fronts, one against Gallipoli under Eje Beg and Ghāzī Fāḍīl, the other against Thrace under Hajji Ilbegi and Evrenos (Evrenuz), all from Karasi. Gallipoli was put under constant pressure by the ghazis, who also tried to cut off its sea communications.<sup>19</sup> In the north Suleiman Pasha succeeded by 1354 in subduing the area between Saros bay and Megali-Agora (Migal-Kara), thus penetrating deep into Thrace.

Determined to maintain themselves in Thrace, the Ottomans pursued their traditional policy of *istimālet*, whereby they tried to win over the native population through friendly and conciliatory treatment, while deporting to Anatolia any Greek military elements capable of organizing resistance.

The Turkish settlement in Thrace caused consternation in Byzantium, but the situation was militarily hopeless. The number of Byzan-

17. According to Enverī, *Düstūrname*, p. 83, the first fortress conquered by the Ottomans in Thrace was not Tzympe but Akcha-Burgos. A village by the name of Akcha-Burgoz in the Kozlu-Dere area near Gallipoli is mentioned in the Ottoman survey book of Gallipoli dated 1476 (Istanbul, Belediye Library, Cevdet no. O-79). In the 'Āshik Pasha-zāde account (*op. cit.*, p. 124) Akcha-Limon or Akcha-Burgoz became the target of Ottoman attacks, but only after the conquest of Jinbi (Tzympe). The Ottomans, he says, after settling at Jinbi, burned the ships lying at Akcha-Limon.

18. The Ottoman tradition ascribes the original idea to the Ottoman leaders, Suleiman or (more likely) Orkhan. Allegedly Eje Beg met Suleiman in Biga, or Suleiman met his father, Orkhan, at Bursa, and got the idea for a permanent conquest of Thrace. These stories were evidently later additions intended to ascribe the original idea to the Ottoman house.

19. They let no ships arrive or disembark at Gallipoli ('Āshik Pasha-zāde, *op. cit.*, p. 124).

tine and Catalan soldiers employed by the empire had greatly diminished, as Cantacuzenus himself admitted, as a result of the recent civil war, so the emperor had for some time been dependent on the Turkish troops sent by his son-in-law Orkhan. The only means left to him to exert pressure on Suleiman were diplomatic, through Orkhan. It appears that Orkhan and the emperor finally signed a treaty providing for the evacuation of the area occupied in Thrace in return for the payment to Suleiman of ten thousand gold pieces.<sup>20</sup>

The earthquake of March 2, 1354, which demolished the walls of Gallipoli and other fortifications in the area, completely altered the situation. Exposed to the raids of the surrounding Turks, most of the towns' population either took shelter in the few fortified places still left standing or fled to Constantinople by sea. The ghazis immediately took possession of Gallipoli and other abandoned sites. The Ottoman tradition says that on this occasion "since there were innumerable 'Frenks' (Catalan mercenaries?) in Gallipoli, it was impossible to capture it. There was nothing more for the ghazis to do but pray for its fall. And then, early one morning the walls suddenly collapsed. Its commander left in a ship."

Suleiman was in his capital, Biga, in Anatolia, when the earthquake occurred. He hurried quickly to Gallipoli and took steps to secure the Turkish presence in the newly occupied places, repairing fortifications and bringing more ghazis and whole colonies of settlers from Anatolia to settle in and reinforce the defenses of the abandoned towns.<sup>21</sup> While he was there, he led his ghazis on a raid for booty into Bulgaria, though sparing Byzantine lands out of respect, apparently, for the recent peace treaty with the emperor.

In the face of Cantacuzenus's protest to Orkhan that Suleiman's occupation of Byzantine cities was against the terms of their peace treaty, Suleiman replied that he had not taken them by force but had simply occupied some abandoned towns. It appears that there was quite a lengthy exchange of views before Orkhan, in exchange for forty thousand gold pieces, agreed to try to persuade his son to heed the emperor's demands. For Cantacuzenus this was a critical issue, upon which his very survival on the Byzantine throne depended, as he was accused by his opponents of "delivering the empire and the Christians into the hands of the Turks".<sup>22</sup> The people of Constantinople were in a state

20. Cantacuzenus, *op cit.*, III, 163, refers repeatedly to such a treaty.

21. On this point 'Âshik Pasha-zâde, *loc. cit.*, and Cantacuzenus, *loc. cit.*, concur; see in particular the important document in Beldiceanu-Steinherr, *Recherches*, pp. 135-148.

22. Nicephorus Gregoras, *Byzantina historia*, II, ed. Schopen (*CSHB*, Bonn, 1830), 3rd rev. ed., by Immanuel Bekker (Bonn, 1855), p. 224.

of great agitation, anticipating that the Turks might even attack the city, when on November 22, 1354, John V Palaeologus suddenly appeared from his exile on Tenedos. In the face of the threatening mobs of the city, Cantacuzenus had no recourse but to resign.

With the fall of Cantacuzenus, Byzantine politics took on a more belligerent orientation, the first stage of which, it was believed, ought to be the resumption of negotiations with pope Innocent VI (1352-1362) for a crusade against the Turks, in exchange for the union of the churches. As early as December 20, 1355, John V Palaeologus, formally promising the union of the churches, always a precondition for papal coöperation, asked for immediate military aid (five galleys and fifteen transport ships with five hundred horse and a thousand footmen within six months), and the preparation of a large-scale crusade against the Turks.<sup>23</sup> That the emperor was in a desperate position was further shown by his promise to send his son Manuel as a hostage to the pope's court at Avignon. At this point, however, it was difficult for the pope even to secure money to maintain the defenses of Smyrna, always his primary concern.

In the summer of 1356, letters sent by the pope to Venice, Genoa, Cyprus, and the Hospitallers asking them to give military aid to the emperor were left unanswered. Even Venice, which was expected to be the most concerned about the Ottoman menace to Byzantium, remained passive. The Ottoman occupation of Gallipoli coincided first with Venice's war against Genoa, and then — despite the efforts of Peter Thomas, the papal nuncio, to bring about peace, while in Buda on his way to Constantinople in 1356 — with resumption of the war between Venice and Hungary in April 1357. It is true that the Venetian bailie in Constantinople warned his government in time about the imminent danger created by the Ottoman settlement in Thrace. As early as 1354, during the panic caused by the news that Gallipoli had fallen, the bailie had written that the Greeks of Constantinople thought they had best put themselves under the protection of a strong Christian government such as Venice, Hungary, or Serbia.<sup>24</sup> The short-sighted and avaricious senate, however, was interested not in considering any steps to be taken against the Ottomans, but rather in forcing the emperor to pay heavy interest on its loans and to strengthen the existing ruinous trade privileges.

23. Halecki, *Un Empereur de Byzance à Rome*, pp. 29-38; see also Setton, *The Papacy*, I, 225-226.

24. Iorga, "Latins," pp. 217-218; letter published by Jireček, *Geschichte der Bulgaren*, p. 309. The bailie was Matthew Venier.

Although Peter Thomas's mission to Constantinople as the pope's nuncio, which lasted from the end of May to November 1357, did not produce the results hoped for by both sides, it is significant nevertheless as the first sign of papal awareness of the immediacy of the Ottoman threat to Byzantium. Following Peter Thomas's mission the pope began to mention Romania and Constantinople side by side with Smyrna as areas that had to be defended against the Turks. It is safe to say that it was at this time that western Europe began to see the Ottomans as the principal enemies of Christendom, and to make Gallipoli one of the principal targets of crusading activities.

When Peter Thomas arrived in Constantinople in the spring of 1357, he found that the emperor was away on campaign against the Ottomans, who had advanced rapidly through Thrace since the fall of Gallipoli in March 1354. As both Byzantine and Ottoman sources recount, immediately following the earthquake and subsequent capture of Gallipoli Suleiman busied himself in creating a strong Turkish bridgehead there. One of the earliest Ottoman traditions says: "[after the capture of Gallipoli] Suleiman sent word to his father: 'Now a great number of people of the Islamic faith are needed here so that the conquered fortresses can be settled and the country around them be made to flourish. We need also many *ghāzī yoldash* (ghazi companions) to garrison and reinforce the conquered fortresses.' Orkhan agreed with the proposal. First they deported over to Rumelia the Arab nomads who had arrived in Karasi. These remained for some time in the area around Gallipoli . . . [while Suleiman made further conquests in Thrace]. Every day new immigrants came over from Karasi. Settling down, these commenced ghazi activities. Briefly speaking, Islam was so strengthened that whenever they attacked, the infidels were unable to resist them."<sup>25</sup>

The capture by Phocaeen corsairs of prince Khalil, the eleven-year-old son of Orkhan, in the early summer of 1357,<sup>26</sup> and the sudden death of Suleiman soon afterward, put Orkhan in a difficult position, compelling him to come to an agreement with John V, as it was only through him that Orkhan could hope to secure the release of his son from captivity. From Gregoras's detailed account of the event it becomes clear that the agreement involved Orkhan's promise to cease all aggression against Byzantine territory, to stop any aid to Matthew Cantacuzenus in Thrace, to reimburse all expenses incurred in the outfitting of ships to be sent against the Phocaeans, and to cancel the

25. 'Ashik Pasha-zâde, *op. cit.*, p. 124; Inalcik, "Arab Camel Drivers in Western Anatolia in the Fifteenth Century," *Revue d'histoire maghrébine*, X (1983), 256-270.

26. Between early June and July; see John's letter in Setton, *The Papacy*, I, 228.

outstanding debts of the emperor.<sup>27</sup> It appears that John V even hoped to recover the territory occupied by the Ottomans in Thrace, since the aggressive Suleiman was now dead. Thus in his answer to the pope's letter dated July 21, 1357, the emperor was able to communicate to Innocent VI some signs of success over his enemies and high hopes for the future.<sup>28</sup> For the ghazis the agreement, signed under duress, was a great sacrifice. It meant the cessation of warfare and the abandonment of the Turks who had recently settled in Thrace.

After his rescue of Khalil from the corsairs in the early summer of 1358,<sup>29</sup> John V conceived a plan that would maintain peace with the Ottomans. Following the example of Cantacuzenus, he secured Orkhan's agreement to the engagement of his daughter Irene, then almost ten years old, to the Ottoman prince in Constantinople. He then returned Khalil to his father at Nicomedia. Furthermore, he had the promise of the old Orkhan that Khalil was to succeed him on the throne at his death. After Suleiman's death prince Murad, with his tutor Lala Shahin, took his place in Gallipoli as frontier lord. Khalil, in his appanage in Nicaea, died soon afterward, in 1359.

The Ottoman tradition<sup>30</sup> is important for the historian of the crusades since it seems to corroborate a disputed account given by Philip of Mézières, the biographer of Peter Thomas, on the crusaders' campaign against the Ottomans in 1359. Back in Constantinople in the autumn of 1359 as the pope's apostolic legate in the east, Peter Thomas had brought with him a small crusading force composed of Hospitalers, Venetians, Genoese, and English soldiers on Venetian galleys. He found John V engaged in hostilities with the Ottomans, Khalil having by that time returned home, and perhaps died. According to Philip the crusaders, joined by Greek forces, captured and burned Lampsacus, an Ottoman transit port on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles. During their return to their ships they were attacked by Turks waiting in ambush. Fleeing in disorder with the legate at their head, the Christians barely escaped a massacre.

Turkish tradition mentions an engagement on the plain adjoining

27. Ostrogorsky, "Byzance, état tributaire de l'empire turc," *Zbornik radova Vizantoloskog Instituta*, V (1958), 49-58.

28. Setton, *The Papacy*, I, 228.

29. See Parisot, *Cantacuzène*, pp. 298-309; Iorga, "Latins," p. 219, but the date given there, 1356, is erroneous.

30. Anonymous, *Tevārikh-i Āl-i 'Othmān*, ed. Giese as *Die altosmanischen anonymen Chroniken . . .*, I (Breslau, 1922), 18; a ghazi tradition in Oruj, *Tevārikh-i Āl-i 'Othmān*, ed. Franz Babinger (Hanover, 1925), p. 19, makes Umur Pasha encourage Suleiman not to abandon his conquests in Europe.



Saros bay on the Aegean, and gives the impression that it occurred shortly after the death of Suleiman in 1357. At that time the Byzantines might have made a show of force there just to intimidate the ghazis into evacuating. But it is also plausible that in 1359 the crusaders made an attack at Saros bay as well as at Lampsacus. At any rate, this was the first Ottoman engagement with a crusading force, and seems to show that Philip's account is in general reliable.

A vigorous Ottoman onslaught started in Thrace under the leadership of prince Murad and his tutor Lala Shahin in 1359. Matthew Villani reports<sup>31</sup> that in 1359 Turks appeared before the walls of Constantinople, the first Ottoman threat against the imperial capital. He may have been referring to an event that is described in *The Anonymous Ottoman Chronicles*<sup>32</sup> as Murad's surrounding a fortress "near Istanbul" in A.H. 761 (October 23, 1359–October 13, 1360).<sup>33</sup> The following year the Ottoman army systematically occupied the fortresses on the two main roads between Constantinople and Adrianople, isolating the latter city and finally forcing it to surrender in the early spring of 1361.<sup>34</sup> To facilitate their rapid occupation of Thrace and its capital Adrianople, the Ottomans appear to have shrewdly made Matthew Cantacuzenus's cause their own, claiming that they were acting to protect the rights of the house of Cantacuzenus in the district of Adrianople, from which he had been driven out. The Ottoman ruler seems to have been exploiting his traditional role as a "supporter" of the rights of Cantacuzenus, his brother-in-law, and it would seem that there were still partisans of the Cantacuzeni in the region.

In connection with the Ottoman offensive between 1359 and 1361, the report of a conspiracy between Lala Shahin and the partisans of Cantacuzenus against John V's life should be mentioned. Rumors of the conspiracy reached Italy at the beginning of 1360, with emphasis on the role played by the Ottomans, who were suspected of desiring through it to lay hands on the imperial city.<sup>35</sup> Orkhan died in 1362, and was succeeded by his son Murad I (1362–1389).

31. Matthew Villani, "Istoria," *RISS*, XIV (Milan, 1729), 549–550; he also tells us that in 1358 the Hospitallers of Rhodes destroyed a Turkish fleet of 29 vessels returning from a raid on the Thracian coast.

32. See note 30.

33. See Inalcik, "The Conquest of Edirne," in *The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Organization and Economy* (London, 1978), no. III, p. 195.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 195–199; Beldiceanu-Steinherr, "La Conquête d'Andrinople par les Turcs," *Tra-vaux et mémoires*, I (Paris, 1965), 431–461, assumes that Hajji Ilbegi and other frontier begs in Thrace acted independently of the Ottomans and conquered Adrianople about 1369.

35. See Parisot, *Cantacuzène*, pp. 306–308; Iorga, "Latins," pp. 220–221.



1. The Near East


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3. Central Europe





5. The Straits and the Aegean

Cartographic Laboratory UW/Madison



6. Northern Syria

Cartographic Laboratory UWF-Madison



7. Palestine






## 8. Cyprus




9. Venice and the Levant in 1300




10. The Ottoman Empire 1300-1451



11. The Ottoman Empire 1451-1522



12. Mongols and Missions in the Thirteenth Century



13. Missions and Mongols in the Fourteenth Century

## *B. Ottoman Conquests and the Crusade, 1361-1421*

In the papal declarations of the second half of the fourteenth century propaganda for the crusade began to be formulated as a defensive struggle to save Europe from the Turks. But actually this meant, at this period, to protect the Latin possessions and interests in Greece and the Aegean Sea against the growing Turkish threat. Also it meant to save Byzantium and eastern Christendom, since the aid was expected to entail the submission of the Greek church to Rome, with resulting advantages for the papacy's position in the west. Throughout the period 1300-1453, however, the campaigns against the Turks turned into full-fledged crusades only when they coincided with the interests of the Venetian colonial empire in the Levant or those of Hungary for its sphere of influence in the Balkans. For Venice it was vital to keep its control over the coasts and islands strategically important for its sea communications with the Levant: Dalmatia, Albania, the Ionian islands, the Morea, and the Aegean, while Hungary under the Angevin king Louis I "the Great" (1342-1382) embarked upon building an empire from the Adriatic to the Black Sea with complete control of the Danubian countries: Dalmatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Wallachia, and Moldavia.

It is therefore important for the historian of the crusades to find out at what particular times these two great powers found the Ottomans a major threat to their interests, and, in the face of this challenge, how they intensified their activities to establish their own control in the threatened areas and consequently tried to mobilize the forces of Christian Europe in "crusades". In the following pages we shall focus our attention on these points.

During the Ottoman expansion in the Balkans the Serbs, Venetians, and Hungarians had to deal first with the frontier begs, and when these Christian states made a major attempt at driving them away they were faced with the Ottoman army under the sultan, the ghazi of the ghazis. The Ottoman military frontier zones in the Balkans moved forward in successive waves: first, from 1354 to 1361, as far as the Maritsa river; second, from 1361 to 1383, up to the Balkan mountain range, to Sredna Gora in the north and to the Strymon (Struma) river in the south; third, from 1383 to 1393, in the Dobruja, along the Danube, and in the Skoplje-Kossovo area; and fourth, from 1393 to 1454, in Albania, Thessaly, upper Serbia, and Vidin. At each shift of the mili-

tary frontier the hinterland came under the direct rule of the Ottoman central government. It was only under Mehmed II (1451–1481) that the Morea, Serbia, and Bosnia would be annexed to the Ottoman empire, making the Balkans south of the Danube a compact Ottoman territory with the exception of some ports or strongholds still under Venetian or Hungarian control. However, it was only with the conquests of Bayazid I “the Thunderbolt” (1389–1402), who extended the Ottoman boundaries to the Danube in the north, Skoplje and southern Albania in the west, and Thessaly in the south, that Hungary and Venice felt, for the first time, the Ottoman threat to their zones of interest as an imminent danger.

In the case of Venice it should be pointed out that as a result of Bayazid’s annexation of the maritime beyliks of western Anatolia in 1389–1390 the Ottomans had become a threatening sea power in the Aegean, and Bayazid challenged the Venetians on the sea and the Straits by converting Gallipoli into a fortified arsenal and naval base on the Dardanelles and by building a castle, Anadolu-Hisar, on the Bosphorus. It was these developments that finally led to the crusade of Nicopolis in 1396.

Hungarian designs on the Balkans go back to the Angevin king Louis I “the Great” (1342–1382), who benefitted in the period 1362–1364 from the Ottoman advance into Bulgaria by extending his sway over the lands south to the Danube. The Byzantine emperor John V Palaeologus saw Hungary as a powerful ally in his plans to recapture Anchialus (Pomorie) and Mesembria (Nesebur) on the Black Sea from the Bulgarians and to drive the Turks out of Europe. In 1365 Hungarian and Byzantine envoys were at the papal court in Avignon to promote a crusade against the Ottomans, and, in his bull of January 22, 1366, pope Urban V (1362–1370) declared a crusade the avowed purpose of which was the expulsion of the Turks from Europe. In the winter of 1365–1366 the emperor himself made a surprise visit to Buda, the Hungarian capital, to induce Louis to move.<sup>36</sup>

In the face of the Hungarian-Byzantine threat, Bulgaria saw no alternative but to make peace and an alliance with the Ottomans. The latter supplied tsar John Alexander (1331–1371) with forces or let him use Turkish mercenaries on the Danube against the Hungarians, and on the Black Sea coasts against the Byzantines in the period 1365–1367.

36. Ostrogorsky, tr. Hussey, pp. 478–480; see the important study by Petăr Nikov, “The Turkish Conquest . . .” (in Bulgarian), *Izvestija na Istoriceckoto Družestvo*, VII–VIII (1928), 41–112; Setton, *The Papacy*, I, 286–291.

In response to the pope's call to a crusade the count of Savoy, Amadeo VI, a cousin of the Byzantine emperor, arrived with a crusading fleet of twenty galleys (stronger than previously thought by historians)<sup>37</sup> at the Dardanelles. He captured Gallipoli from the Ottomans late in August 1366; then, passing to the Black Sea, he took Anchialus and Mesembria from the Bulgarians for the Byzantines in October, and finally laid siege to Varna, though still awaiting the promised crusader army of the Hungarian king. The crusading plan to go to the aid of the Byzantines was eventually postponed, and in 1367 Ottoman forces appeared before Sozopolis, which had been conquered by Amadeo VI in the previous year. In 1367 the Bulgarians, with the support of Ottoman forces, also threatened the Hungarians in Vidin, and the Hungarian king had to ask the coöperation of the Wallachian voivode Vlad I (ca. 1360-1372) against them.<sup>38</sup> By then the Byzantines had become more apprehensive of Louis's crusading plans than of the Turks. The Angevin king's plans included the conversion to Catholicism of the Orthodox peoples of the Balkans and the capture of Constantinople. The first move by Louis was the subjection of the Bulgarians to his sovereignty, and the establishment of his control in the Vidin area. In 1366 he had created the banat of "Bulgaria", which included Vidin, Orshova, Mühlenbach (Sebesh), and Temesvár.<sup>39</sup> In April 1367 the Byzantine emperor hastily made peace with the Bulgarian tsar John Alexander, which displeased Louis. Hungarian possession of Vidin did not last long, and Louis's crusade project remained only a dream.

It is not correct that after the conquest of Adrianople (Edirne) in 1361 Murad, then still only a prince, had made it the capital city of the Ottoman state. Upon the death of his father Orkhan in March 1362 Murad I had hurriedly come to Bursa (the capital until 1402), and had then moved to defend the Ankara area against the Anatolian emirs of Eretna and Karaman. Lala Shahin, commander-in-chief of the Ottoman forces in Rumelia, in coöperation with the frontier begs Evrenos and Hajji-Ilbegi, was responsible for the Ottoman activities in Europe into the 1370's. Because of the fall of Gallipoli in 1366 and the constant threat from the Byzantine stronghold of Pegae (Kara-Biga) on the southern Marmara coast, Murad found it risky to cross over to Europe before 1373. Thus, despite initial advances in the Maritsa valley and toward the Serbian principality of Serres in the south, the

37. Setton, *The Papacy*, I, 294.

38. Iorga, *Geschichte*, I, 230-231; for the oft-repeated legend of Louis I's crusade against the Ottomans see Gheorghe I. Bratianu, "L'Expédition de Louis I de Hongrie contre le prince de Valachie Radu I Basarab," *Revue historique du sud-est européen*, II (1925), 4-6.

39. Huber, "Ludwig I. von Ungarn," p. 30.



Ottoman begs remained in general on the defensive. This situation also explains why they chose coöperation with the Bulgarian tsar and why the Byzantines embarked upon feverish efforts to drive the Turks out of Thrace in the period 1366–1371. These Byzantine activities had been preceded by contact through the patriarch Callistus with the despot John Ugljesha, prince of Serres, in 1363–1364, and by intense Byzantine diplomatic activity in the courts of the pope and the Hungarian king to promote a crusade in 1365–1366; they were highlighted by John V Palaeologus's visit to Italy and conversion to Latin Catholicism in Rome in 1369.

A Serbian army under Ugljesha and his brother Vukashin attempted to take Adrianople in 1371. The Ottoman frontier forces inflicted a crushing defeat on the Serbs by a surprise night attack at Chernomen on September 26, killing both brothers. "With the defeat of Maritsa (Chernomen) began the Turkish domination over the southern Slavs."<sup>40</sup> Turkish raiders overran Macedonia and invaded as far as Thessaly and Albania.<sup>41</sup> An interesting document<sup>42</sup> granting protection and exemption from taxes to the monks of the monastery of Saint John Prodrome near Serres attests to the Ottoman influence in Macedonia in 1372/1373. According to the early Ottoman traditions Murad I, on his way to the Dardanelles to support the ghazis who had informed him of the Serbian attack on Adrianople, had first to stop and reduce Pegae, which threatened his retreat.<sup>43</sup> Thus it can be said that in 1371 the Byzantine-Serbian alliance was a fact, and while the frontier begs of Rumelia had to meet the Serbian army, Murad had to fight the Byzantines at Pegae.

The Ottoman victory at Chernomen seems to have caused alarm at the threat of an Ottoman invasion of Italy. Exaggerated rumors spread about Ottoman plans for conquering Albania and the ports on the Adriatic.<sup>44</sup> The pope invited France, England, and Flanders to unite for a crusade, and wanted the Christian rulers in the Levant, including the Byzantine emperor, to send delegates to a meeting at Thebes to discuss joint action against the Ottomans, but no such meeting took place.

King Louis of Hungary, however, showed his concern by taking an

40. Jireček, *Geschichte der Serben*, II, 438; Halecki, *Empereur*, pp. 188–212.

41. Dujčev, "La Conquête turque," *Byzantinoslavica*, *loc. cit.*

42. Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, "Early Ottoman Documents of the Prodromos Monastery (Serres)," *Südost-Forschungen*, XXVIII (1969), 1–12.

43. A close critical examination of the early Ottoman traditions has not yet been done; see Inalcik in *Historians of the Middle East*, pp. 152–167.

44. Setton, *The Papacy*, I, 328–329.

oath to go on a crusade the following year, and asked the Venetians and Ragusans to build galleys for him. But his intentions were of another nature. The Ottoman victory at Chernomen and ensuing raids served Louis's old plans to strengthen Hungarian control over the Danubian lands. Louis's "crusade" was actually one against Orthodox "schismatic" peoples of Serbia, Bosnia, and Bulgaria. By May of 1356, following the dismemberment of Stephen Dushan's empire, Louis had already declared a crusade against "schismatics".<sup>45</sup> Under the king's protection the Franciscans were zealously pursuing their conversion efforts in the Balkans. This policy totally alienated the Orthodox population and princes in the Balkans from Hungary, and prepared the way for the Ottomans, who often appeared with their policy of *istimâlet* or "reconciliation" as protectors of the Orthodox church and local princes. Actually the Hungarians and Turks, pressing the Slavic nations from north and south, were helping each other's advance until the day they faced each other. However, in 1373 Murad at the request of the Venetian senate sent a force of 5,000 mercenaries against the Hungarians in Dalmatia.<sup>46</sup>

After Chernomen the Serbian princes in Macedonia—Mark Kraljevič, the despot Dragash Dejanovich, and his brother Constantine—agreed to pay tribute and to serve in the Ottoman army. Serres came back under Greek rule under Manuel Palaeologus, the future emperor, but the frontier beg Evrenos established a march there under Delü Balaban, who carried on ghazi warfare against Manuel. Not only the Serbian princes of Macedonia and the new Bulgarian tsar Shishman, but also emperor John V after his return from Italy (October 28, 1371), had to recognize Murad's suzerainty after Chernomen.<sup>47</sup> The emperor's visit to Italy and his conversion to Catholicism had failed to bring about a naval crusade, or secure the coöperation of Hungary, which was considered the only land power capable of driving the Turks back to Anatolia. By the time of John V's visit to Europe the Ottomans seem to have supported an anti-western faction in Byzantium, with Andronicus IV, the ambitious son of the emperor, at its head. From then on the Ottoman ruler, as suzerain of the Byzantine emperor, shrewdly manipulated and profited from disputes for power in the Palaeologian family, which erupted as civil wars in 1373, 1376-1379, and 1390.

45. Huber, "Ludwig I. von Ungarn," p. 27.

46. *R.I.S.S.*, XVII (1760), col. 176, cited by Herbert A. Gibbons, *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire: a History of the Osmanlis . . . (1300-1403)* (Oxford, 1916), p. 149; for early relations between Murad I and Venice see Thiriet, *Régestes*, I, no. 423 (1365).

47. Charanis, "The Strife among the Palaeologi and the Ottoman Turks," p. 292.

Murad also exploited the fierce rivalry between the Venetians and the Genoese for possession of Tenedos in the war of Chioggia, 1378–1381. In October 1376, when Andronicus promised Tenedos, key to the Dardanelles, to the Genoese, Venice occupied the island. Andronicus captured Constantinople and the Byzantine throne with Ottoman and Genoese support. At the beginning of 1377 he delivered Gallipoli to the Ottomans after ten years of Byzantine possession. Those Byzantines favoring the western alliance and a crusade were against the surrender of Gallipoli, but the populace and senate approved Andronicus's decision. As a vassal of Murad, the emperor was not actually in a position to block the passage of the Turks anyhow. In the face of the cooperation among Murad, Andronicus, and the Genoese, Venice took John V's side. But the latter could recover his throne (July 1, 1379) only after promising more favorable tributes of vassaldom to Murad—a military contingent for his campaigns, a yearly payment higher than before, and the surrender of Philadelphia, Byzantium's last important possession in inland Anatolia.<sup>48</sup>

The rapid Ottoman expansion was considerably assisted by the defeatism and hopelessness among the Greeks and other Balkan nations. In his criticisms, the pro-western Demetrius Cydones reflects this psychology by attacking those cooperating with the Turks among the high-placed while, he says, the populace, especially city dwellers in the grip of poverty and shortages, also favored Ottoman rule. The church was openly discussing whether the Turks were preferable to the pope or not. On various occasions the Greek church was unwilling to give up its income from land rents to finance military preparations against the Ottomans. Turkish sovereignty was often presented as an inevitable consequence of divine judgment for the sins of the Christians.<sup>49</sup> The Ottomans steadily promoted the same idea, and in their *istimālet* propaganda they promised a peaceful and prosperous existence under their rule; in general, they delivered what they had promised.

From 1373 on, assured of Byzantine cooperation, the sultan could cross with his army over to Europe without fear of being cut off from Anatolia. The Ottomans were encouraged by international developments in this period. Following the death in September 1382 of Louis

48. *Ibid.*, p. 299; Peter Schreiner, "Zur Geschichte Philadelphias im 14. Jahrhundert (1293–1390)," *Orientalia Christiana periodica*, XXXV (1969), 404–405.

49. Dujčev, "La Conquête turque," pp. 486–489; Speros Vryonis, *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1971), pp. 408–421; Ihor Ševčenko, *La Vie intellectuelle et politique à Byzance sous les premiers Paléologues* (Brussels, 1962).

I of Hungary, who had styled himself "king of Serbia, Dalmatia, and Bulgaria", Hungary was in the grip of an internal struggle for succession. Even the Serbian knez Lazar I (1371-1389) in the Morava valley and Bosnia, who supported the Angevins for the Hungarian throne, was involved in the struggle against Louis's successor Sigismund (1385-1437).<sup>50</sup> At the same time, the rivalry between Venice and Hungary for Dalmatia prevented these two powers from acting jointly against the Ottomans for the whole period until 1394. Also the Genoese-Venetian rivalry over Tenedos and the waterways to the Black Sea, which caused a destructive war between the two republics, neutralized these maritime powers in respect to the Ottomans, who had been allied to the Genoese since 1352. The diplomatic revolution leading to the Hungarian-Venetian alliance would come only after the Ottoman occupation of Bulgaria in 1393.<sup>51</sup>

By the treaty of June 8, 1387, with Genoa, Murad I renewed commercial privileges granted previously by Orkhan.<sup>52</sup> Genoese documents of the period show that the Ottomans maintained close commercial relations with the Genoese and were visiting Pera. It also appears that the Ottoman Porte did not openly challenge Venice during Murad's reign (1362-1389). The republic continued to purchase wheat from the Ottoman territories (Thrace?) and even hoped to be allowed by Murad to establish a colony at Scutari, just across from the rival Genoese colony at Pera, making diplomatic attempts in 1365, 1368, and 1384.<sup>53</sup> In brief, the Ottomans succeeded in maintaining the neutrality of the Italian maritime powers which were in control of the Straits during the period when Murad embarked upon his extensive conquests in the Balkans.

In 1383 Murad, crossing the Straits, established his headquarters in Adrianople and sent an army under the grand vizir Khayreddin Pasha and Evrenos to conquer the rich coastal plains and cities of western Thrace between the lower Nestos (Mesta) and the Strymon (Struma). The Ottomans employed their navy under Azeb Beg to cut off aid from the sea. Kavalla (Christopolis), Drama, Zichne, and Serres in this region, which had been under blockade for many years, surrendered on terms.<sup>54</sup> The raiders extended their activities as far as Albania and the

50. Jireček, *Geschichte der Serben*, II, 117.

51. The best analysis of Venetian diplomacy of this period is still Silberschmidt, *Das orientalische Problem 1381-1400*.

52. Heyd, tr. Raynaud, II, 259-260.

53. *Ibid.*

54. The city of Serres was taken only in 1383 but the countryside had already come under the control of the Ottoman frontier forces under Delü Balaban in 1372. The Ottoman chronicles

Morea, and Thessalonica and other cities were attacked. After the campaign of 1383, however, the center of the new Ottoman march under Evrenos was Serres, and the Strymon river became the new border.

In 1385 a larger campaign in the Balkans was organized under the sultan. The operations were conducted in two directions. An army under the beglerbeg of Rumelia and Evrenos invaded Macedonia and took the plain of Thessalonica; though without success against the city itself, it captured Verrai (Fere or Kara-Ferye in Turkish sources). Monastir surrendered and raiders forayed as far as Charles I Tocco's territory in Epirus.<sup>55</sup>

While the army under the beglerbeg was advancing on the ancient Via Egnatia, the main army under Murad himself followed the famous military route in the Maritsa valley toward Danubian Serbia. He was able to cross the historic pass of the Nishava river and in the autumn of 1385 he captured Nish,<sup>56</sup> only fifty miles from knez Lazar's capital, Krushevats. The Serbian ruler saw no alternative to accepting the Ottoman overlordship under the heavy conditions of dispatching a contingent of one thousand men to Murad's campaigns and paying fifty *okka*<sup>57</sup> (about 140 pounds) of silver annually as tribute. At this time Hungary was too involved in its internal struggle over the succession to intervene.

The course of events leading to the historic battle of Kosovo-Polje is described thus in the earliest Ottoman tradition.<sup>58</sup> In 1385 the Karamanids, taking advantage of the absence of Murad and the Anatolian forces, had invaded the disputed area in Hamid which had been conquered by the Ottomans in 1381. In the summer of 1386 Murad's Ottomans defeated the Karamanid Aläeddin Ali in a pitched battle

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make this distinction; see particularly the conquest of "Siroz" (Serres) in the anonymous *Tevârîkh-i Âl-i 'Othmân* (Paris, Bibl. nat., MS. suppl. turc 1047), fol. 19<sup>v</sup>; I cannot agree with the interpretation of Beldiceanu-Steinherr, "La Prise de Serrès," *Acta historica, Societas academica Dacoromana*, IV (1965), 15-24. The date of the final conquest is established by Ostrogorsky, "La Prise de Serrès par les Turcs," *Byzantion*, XXXV (1965), 302-319; and *idem*, *Serska Oblast* (Belgrade, 1965), pp. 126-160.

55. Ottoman compilations of the late fifteenth century by Idris and Neshrî confuse the chronology and order of events. 'Ashik Pasha-zâde and the anonymous chronicles are more faithful to their original sources. My chronology is based on a critical study of these sources. The date of the conquest of Verrai (787/1385) is confirmed in Christian sources; see Jireček, *Geschichte der Serben*, II, 107, and Silberschmidt, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-96.

56. Serbian annals (see Jireček, *Geschichte der Serben*, II, 118) give the date as 1386.

57. 50,000 *okka* in Neshrî, *Ġihännümâ: Die altosmanische Chronik des Mevlânâ Mehemed Neshrî*, ed. Theodor Menzel and Taeschner, I (Leipzig, 1951), 58, but only 50 *okka* in Idris.

58. Neshrî, *op. cit.*, p. 71; and Enverî, *Düstûrnâme*, pp. 85-87; for Serbian annals on Kosovo see Gavro A. Skrivanić, *Kosovska Vitka* (Četinje, 1956); *Lebensbeschreibung des Despoten Stefan Lazarević von Konstantin dem Philosophen*, tr. Braun.

at Frenk-Yazusu, where the Serbian contingent fought on the left wing.<sup>59</sup> Upon the return home of the Serbian contingent, which complained of harsh treatment in the Ottoman army, Lazar renounced his allegiance to Murad and tried to bring about a coalition of the subjected Balkan states against the Ottomans. The defeat at Plochnik on August 27, 1388, of an Ottoman frontier force under Kavala Shahin,<sup>60</sup> who had invaded Bosnia in collaboration with Balsha, lord of Scutari, encouraged tsar Shishman and despot Dobrotich, the Bulgarian rulers, and Tvrtko I, ruler of Bosnia (1353-1391), to form a coalition with Lazar. This was followed by an agreement between Sigismund, king of Hungary, and Lazar, who accepted the obligations of vassalage as under Louis I.<sup>61</sup>

In order to secure his rear in his campaign against Serbia, Murad sent Ali Pasha Chandarli, the new grand vizir, against Shishman and Dobrotich in the autumn of 1388. Ali, at the head of the forces of Rumelia, made a swift raid into Bulgaria, and in the spring of 1389, when Murad crossed the Dardanelles, Ali continued operations in Danubian Bulgaria, where tsar Shishman had taken refuge in Nicopolis. Tirnovo, the capital of Shishman, surrendered (but was not occupied) and the tsar finally submitted in Nicopolis. Then Ali Pasha joined the sultan's army near Philippopolis (Plovdiv; Filibe) and the whole army marched in the direction of Kossovo-Polje. The Christian lords of Küstendil (Konstantin) and Timok (Saraj) joined Murad's army. The Anatolian emirates, including Karaman, had responded to his call and sent contingents for this crucial confrontation between the forces of Islam and Christendom.

The Serbian army included contingents from Bosnia under Vlatko Vukovich and from Croatia under ban John Horvath, as well as mercenaries or volunteers comprising "Franks, Vlachs, Albanians, Hungarians, Czechs, and Bulgarians". In the western Balkans (Ragusa, Albania, and Bosnia) cannon was known by 1380, and reliable Ottoman and Serbian sources attest to its use at the battle of Kossovo in the summer of 1389.<sup>62</sup> The Ottoman victory at Kossovo marks the estab-

59. A contemporary Ottoman source in Neshri, *op. cit.*, p. 59, dates it as the spring of 788/1386. Another contemporary source, 'Aziz Astarabadi, *Bazm u Razm*, ed. Köprülü (Istanbul, 1928), p. 313, is not clear here in its chronology; it contains complementary details on Murad's conquests in Tekke.

60. Kavala Shahin is often confused with Lala Shahin, beglerbeg of Rumelia under Murad I.

61. Huber, "Die Gefangennehmung der Königinnen Elisabeth und Maria von Ungarn und die Kämpfe König Sigismunds gegen die Neapolitanische Partei und die übrigen Reichsfeinde in den Jahren 1386-1395," *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte*, LXVI (1885), 523; Jireček, *Geschichte der Serben*, II, 119.

62. See D. Petrovič, "Fire-arms in the Balkans," in *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, ed. Vernon J. Parry and Malcolm E. Yapp (London, 1975), pp. 164-172.

lishment of Ottoman overlordship in Serbia and the beginning of the Ottoman-Hungarian rivalry over this key area between the Balkans and Central Europe. On the battlefield Murad I was assassinated, and Lazar was captured and executed.

Stephen, the new knez (1389–1427), and his mother Militsa under the threat of Hungarian invasion readily accepted the protection of and vassalage to Bayazid I, the new sultan, and her daughter despina (lady) Olivera was given in marriage to Bayazid. Ottoman garrisons were stationed in the important fortresses on the Danube, including Golubats. In the autumn of 1389 Sigismund invaded Serbia and took Borach (Bor) and Chestin in upper Serbia. The following summer Ottoman-Serbian forces fought together against the Hungarian bans.<sup>63</sup>

Bayazid had to return to Anatolia in haste since the Anatolian vassal emirs, in alliance with Alāeddin Ali of Karaman and Burhāneddin of Sivas (Sebastia), upon learning of the death of Murad I at Kossovo had initiated an uprising.<sup>64</sup> Bayazid was occupied in Anatolia warring against the emirs from 1389 to 1392. During this period he annexed the maritime emirates of Sarukhan, Aydin, and Menteshe in western Anatolia and the old Selchukid emirates of Germiyan, Hamid, and Kastamonu, and extended his control to the Amasya region, where he was challenged by the powerful sultan of Sivas. By his conquests in Anatolia Bayazid established his authority and greatly increased his power, and in 1393 he returned to the Balkans to assert his sovereignty over the Christian vassal states, which had, during his absence, slackened their ties to the Ottoman state and come into the orbit of Hungary and Venice.

The urgent problem for the Ottomans was to reassert control over Danubian Bulgaria. In 1391 with Sigismund's support Mircea cel Bătrân ("the Old"), voivode of Wallachia (1386–1418), had invaded northern Bulgaria as far as Karnobad, while Bayazid was occupied in Anatolia. In late 1392 Bayazid exchanged embassies with Ladislav, king of Naples (1386–1414), a rival of Sigismund for the Hungarian throne.<sup>65</sup> The following summer Bayazid invaded Bulgaria, taking Tirnovo on July 17, 1393, and placed tsar Shishman in Nicopolis as an Ottoman vassal to guard against Hungarian-Wallachian encroachments. Prior to his campaigns into Greece, Hungary, and Wallachia, Bayazid called all the Ottoman vassal princes to a meeting in the winter of 1393–1394

63. Jireček, *Geschichte der Serben*, II, 124.

64. The main source is Astarābādī, *Bazm u Razm*, pp. 383, 387–388.

65. Silberschmidt, *op. cit.*, pp. 47–48.

to make sure of their loyalty and coöperation;<sup>66</sup> the meeting place was Verrai, not "Serrai" (Serres) as reported in some Byzantine sources.<sup>67</sup> As the new Byzantine emperor, Manuel II (1391-1425), himself confirms, the appearance of the vassal princes before the sultan was a custom and condition of Ottoman suzerainty.

Bayazid's next moves were an invasion of Thessaly and the county of Salona on February 20, 1394, and the occupation of Thessalonica on April 21. Bayazid's insistence on direct control of the strategic cities and areas in the Balkans frightened his vassals.

Though authoritarian in his dealings with his vassals, Bayazid had shown a conciliatory attitude toward Venice after the annexation of the emirates of western Anatolia in the winter of 1389-1390. In May 1390 he reconfirmed the capitulations made under the Aydin dynasty, in response to the mission of Francis Querini. Venice would not have opposed the Ottomans if its commercial privileges and maritime security had been guaranteed. But in 1391 the corsairs of western Anatolia, now under Ottoman control, had begun their attacks against Venetian possessions in the Aegean and the Morea, forcing the senate to take new defense measures and send protests to the sultan. Construction of galleys in Constantinople, Thessalonica, and other ports for the Ottoman navy in the spring of 1392 caused great concern in Venice. Manuel II was then acting as a loyal vassal of the sultan and appeared to be using Ottoman power to block Venetian dominance in the Aegean and the Straits.

As under Umur Pasha half a century earlier, the Turkish navy had once again become an aggressive and threatening power. In the spring of 1392 the Venetian senate gave orders to their "captain of the Gulf" to proceed to the Aegean and attack Ottoman warships on the open sea. The reappearance of the threat of Turkish sea power under Bayazid led Venice to consider reviving the Latin League in the Aegean, with the participation of Lesbos, Chios, Rhodes, and Cyprus.

In the summer of 1392 the Ottoman navy sailed to the Black Sea to coöperate with Bayazid's army against Suleiman, emir of Kastamonu, so Venetian apprehension of an immediate Ottoman attack faded. In 1394 after the Verrai meeting Venice welcomed Manuel's request for aid against the sultan, who wanted to establish full control of Constantinople.

66. See Barker, *Manuel II*, pp. 112-122.

67. The fact that the meeting-place was Verrai, not Serrai (Serres), was first indicated by Karl Hopf, and after him by Silberschmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 95. In the Ottoman sources the date is given (mistakenly) as after 798/1395.



The despot Theodore Palaeologus (1382–1407) had become an Ottoman vassal in 1388, in order to gain Ottoman support for his struggle against the Latin barons, and especially for his fight against Venice for Argos. According to the famous inscription of Parori, he said he was ruling in the Morea in the name of the sultan.<sup>68</sup> But when, after the meeting of Verrai, Bayazid required the surrender of Argos and other strategic places in the Morea, Theodore managed to flee to the Morea, where he made an alliance with Venice against the Ottomans by the agreement of Modon on May 2, 1394. He surrendered Argos to the Venetians and then with their assistance captured Monemvasia from the Ottoman garrison.<sup>69</sup>

But the major event leading to the crusade was Bayazid's invasion of Hungary in 1394. We learn from a later Ottoman document<sup>70</sup> that in that year the Ottoman army under the sultan himself entered Hungary near Belgrade,<sup>71</sup> attacked Slankamen, Titel, Becskerek, Temesvár, Carashova, Caransebesh, and Mehadia deep in Transylvania, and then turned south into Wallachia in the direction of Nicopolis. There Mircea barred the way to the Ottoman army at the mountain pass of Rovine near Argesh, his capital. On October 10, 1394, Bayazid's army escaped disaster only after a fierce battle at Argesh in which the vassal Serbian princes Mark Kraljevich and Constantine Dejanovich and several Ottoman begs fell.<sup>72</sup> The sultan crossed the Danube at Nicopolis on ships supplied by tsar Shishman, who was placed there by Bayazid in 1393 when Tirnovo, his capital, was occupied by the Ottomans. Suspicious of Shishman's secret relations with Mircea and Sigismund,<sup>73</sup>

68. Loenertz, "Pour l'histoire du Péloponnèse au XIVe siècle (1382–1404)," *Études byzantines*, I (1943), 169–171; Turks from western Anatolia had appeared in the Morea as mercenaries or allies since the time of Michael IX Palaeologus (1294–1320). According to Loenertz, Ottoman Turks interfered in Moreote affairs following their conquest of Thessalonica in 1387. Theodore went to Murad's court to offer his allegiance in 1388.

69. *Ibid.*, 183–184.

70. See *Actes du Xe Congrès international d'études byzantines* (Istanbul, 1956), p. 220; the original is in the Topkapı Sarayı archives, no. 6374. Apparently it was a report prepared for Mehmed II for a campaign in Hungary or Wallachia.

71. The Topkapı document says that there was no fortress at Belgrade at that time whereas the Paris anonymous (Bibl. nat., MS. suppl. turc 1047) speaks of the siege of Belgrade for a month.

72. On the basis of a document dated October 1395 concerning a donation made by Helen for the soul of her father, Constantine Dejanovich, G. S. Radojčić, "La Chronologie de la bataille de Rovine," *Revue historique du sud-est européen*, V (1928), 136–139, puts the date of the battle as May 17, 1395, the date of Constantine's death as found in Serbian annals. But now the Topkapı document provides new details supporting October 1394. On the battle itself Enverfi, *Düstürnâme*, p. 88, gives interesting details.

73. According to von Aschbach, *Geschichte Kaiser Sigmunds*, I, 99, tsar Shishman had shifted to the Hungarian side.

Bayazid, once across the river, seized and executed Shishman on June 3, 1395,<sup>74</sup> and appointed Vlad voivode of Wallachia. Mircea took refuge in Transylvania in March 1396 and joined Sigismund in Kronstadt (Brashov). Together they descended on the Danube and in May recaptured Little Nicopolis on the north bank, opposite Nicopolis, and installed a Hungarian garrison. The Hungarian army was, however, harassed by Vlad on his way back home.<sup>75</sup>

Thus in 1393-1395 the whole of Bulgaria was annexed to the Ottoman empire, and Wallachia came under an Ottoman vassal prince.<sup>76</sup> On the Danube front Dristra (Silistra) and the Dobruja, long disputed between Bulgarian and Wallachian princes, became the seat of an Ottoman frontier lord. Nicopolis, which was in Ottoman hands, became the key fortress for control of Bulgaria and Wallachia. Farther to the west at Vidin, the Bulgarian tsar Sracimir (Sratsimir) was a loyal vassal of the sultan, and an Ottoman garrison was stationed there. To restore Hungarian influence and control in the area, Sigismund saw that he needed the support of the whole of Christian Europe, and especially of Venice. Just at this juncture Venice, as we have seen, abandoned its neutral attitude and decided to enter the struggle and to support any joint undertaking against the Ottomans.

The Ottoman invasion of Hungary in 1394 aroused genuine concern in pope Boniface IX (1389-1404) in Rome.<sup>77</sup> In October the pope issued, upon Sigismund's appeal, a bull for a crusade against the Ottomans.<sup>78</sup> On December 23 a Byzantine envoy arrived in Venice requesting aid and urging war against Bayazid. In early 1395 Venice became the center of the negotiations for a crusade. Reversing its cautious policy vis-à-vis the Ottomans, the senate decided to try full coöperation with Hungary. Venice also promised to send a fleet to the Dardanelles to cut off Ottoman communication between Anatolia and Rumelia. Sigismund secured a Burgundian-French contingent for the crusade, but there were rumors in France that John Galeazzo Visconti of Milan, threatened by the French, had exchanged embassies of friendship with the Ottoman sultan.<sup>79</sup> Ladislas of Naples, the rival of Sigismund, was another Italian ruler in contact with "the enemy of Christendom". A

74. The Topkapi document, no. 6374.

75. Von Aschbach, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

76. The Topkapi document claims that Mircea was a tributary of the sultan prior to the campaign of 1394.

77. Setton, *The Papacy*, I, 342-343.

78. Sigismund's letter to the pope in October 1394, mentioning Bayazid's invasion of Hungary, must have been written before the battle of Argesh on October 10.

79. See Setton, *The Papacy*, I, 347 and note 94.

Byzantine-Hungarian alliance was signed in Buda in February 1396 and Venice was informed about it in March.

Without this Balkan background the crusade of Nicopolis cannot be adequately explained. Western participation in the crusade appears to be grossly exaggerated in western accounts. The crusaders from western Europe, "une multitude de chevaliers sans experience, sans ordre,"<sup>80</sup> was apparently quite a small contingent, and yet they intended "to conquer the whole of Turkey and march into the empire of Persia, . . . the kingdom of Syria, and the Holy Land of Jerusalem".

Vlad of Wallachia, an Ottoman vassal, was attacked from the north by Stephen Lackovich, the voivode of Transylvania, but the Serbs under Stephen Lazarevich joined Bayazid's army. The Ottoman strategy was to delay the advance of the crusaders by resisting them in the fortified cities, in order to give the sultan, who was at the head of his army besieging Constantinople, time to gather his forces. The crusaders met resistance at Vidin and Rahova in late August and were held up by a stiff defense at the stronghold of Nicopolis (September 8–10). Bayazid surprised the crusaders at Nicopolis, and the ensuing pitched battle ended in a complete victory for the sultan (September 25, 1396),<sup>81</sup> who won fame throughout Islam as a ghazi.

Sigismund, Philibert of Naillac (soon to be grand master of the Hospitallers), and a few other leaders escaped down the Danube in a small boat, and John of Nevers and several other captive nobles were held for ransom, but most of the crusaders who survived the battle were enslaved or slaughtered by the infuriated sultan. The shocked reaction of western Europe to this disaster led to disillusion with the crusade idea and refusal to participate in similar expeditions for nearly half a century.

Venice took part in the crusade, but the small Venetian fleet of four galleys under Thomas Mocenigo, captain of the Gulf, was instructed not to engage in military operations beyond the northern Aegean and to stay with the members of the Aegean league—Rhodes, Chios, and Lemnos. By his naval preparations at Gallipoli and strict ban on wheat export to Venice, Bayazid had taken measures against the republic.<sup>82</sup>

80. Iorga, *Histoire des roumaines*, III (Bucharest, 1937), 362.

81. See the discussion of the size of the crusader army in Setton, *The Papacy*, I, 351–353. Delbrück's estimate of ten thousand for the Ottoman army is confirmed by the Ottoman anonymous (Paris 1047), fols. 22<sup>r</sup>–22<sup>v</sup>: "upon the news of the invasion Bayazid hurried to Nicopolis taking with him an army of ten thousand select troops." Each man had a pair of horses to go at maximum speed. At Tirnovo Rumelian forces joined the sultan. For details of the battle see Setton, *The Papacy*, I, 353–355.

82. Silberschmidt, *op. cit.*, pp. 158–160.

After Nicopolis Venice had to take more serious steps to protect Constantinople and Euboea.

After his victory Bayazid turned against Byzantium, which he held responsible for the crusade; now its conquest appeared easier than ever. The sultan's pressure on Constantinople in October 1396 is confirmed by Venetian and Genoese documents, as well as by the Ottoman chronicles.<sup>83</sup> Venice feared that the fall of Constantinople was quite imminent, and hastily sent instructions dated October 29, 1396, to Mocenigo to take appropriate measures.<sup>84</sup> Ottoman tradition makes it clear that immediately after the battle of Nicopolis Bayazid turned his army against Constantinople and demanded the surrender of the city. Negotiations were concluded by the emperor's pledging allegiance, with the payment of a yearly tribute of ten thousand gold ducats and the establishment of a Turkish quarter in Constantinople with a qadi and a mosque. (Our source adds that the Moslems from Göynük and Tarakli-Yeniye who were settled in the quarter were driven out of the city after Bayazid's defeat at Ankara by Timur [Tamerlane] in 1402.) Apparently the sultan never gave up his intention of taking the city, but temporarily acquiesced to the peace offer of the emperor<sup>85</sup> at a time when pressing problems in Anatolia confronted him.

While Bayazid was occupied in Anatolia, first in conquering Karaman territory and then in fighting against sultan Burhāneddin of Sivas in the Amasya area in 1397, and the following year in capturing several cities in the Euphrates valley from the Mamluks, Manuel II was busy sending diplomatic missions to try to persuade the courts of France, Rome, and Venice to send a crusade to deliver Constantinople from its fate.<sup>86</sup> In 1397 Venice was seriously concerned about the alleged plans of the ex-emperor John VII to surrender the city, and took naval measures to prevent it.<sup>87</sup> Marshal John Boucicault's fruitless expedition (1399) and Manuel II's visit to European capitals in quest of aid (1400-1403) did not bring about any change in the situation.<sup>88</sup>

83. *Ibid.*; Thiriet, *Régestes*, I, no. 914.

84. *Ibid.*, nos. 917, 918; but Silberschmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 165, thinks that references in the documents belong to the period before the battle of Nicopolis; cf. Setton, *The Papacy*, I, 358. The letter of the vicarius of Pera thanking the Venetians is dated October 28, 1396; for the sultan's siege of Constantinople after Nicopolis see 'Ashik Pasha-zāde, *op. cit.*, 67-68; Neshri, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

85. In his letter dated July 1, 1397 (see Barker, *Manuel II*, pp. 154-155), Manuel II speaks of three years of hard times in the war against Bayazid I.

86. *Ibid.*, pp. 149-160.

87. *Ibid.*, pp. 138-146.

88. Setton, *The Papacy*, I, 370-385; Barker, *Manuel II*, pp. 154-199.

Manuel's departure for Europe made the sultan furious,<sup>89</sup> and he forthwith demanded that John VII surrender the city.<sup>90</sup> A naval league against the Ottomans comprising the Hospitallers, the Genoese of Chios, and James Crispo, the duke of the Archipelago (1397–1418), was then considered by the Venetian senate.<sup>91</sup> Byzantium's salvation, however, would come from the east. In 1400 Timur captured Sivas, an Ottoman city since 1398, and on July 28, 1402, he defeated Bayazid at the battle of Ankara and made him a prisoner;<sup>92</sup> he died in captivity a few months later, probably by suicide.

Between 1402 and 1413 Bayazid's sons Suleiman (in Adrianople), Mehmed (at Amasya), and 'Isa (at Bursa) fought for the succession. Their civil wars kept them too weak and divided to threaten Constantinople, Venice, or Hungary, which enjoyed the respite without making any serious effort to strengthen their defenses against the inevitable resurgence of Ottoman power. The eventual winner, Mehmed I, ruled for eight more years, but deliberately made no military or diplomatic moves to destroy the unwonted calm.

### *C. The Struggle for the Balkans, 1421–1451*

During the civil war, however, Byzantium had learned the most efficient way to check Ottoman aggressiveness and obtain concessions. At the accession on June 25, 1421, of Mehmed I's son Murad II, who was declared sultan in Bursa at the age of seventeen,<sup>93</sup> Manuel II set Mustafa, Murad's uncle, free in the Balkans, where he was joined by many leaders of the Ottoman forces, including powerful frontier begs.

Mustafa had agreed to return to the emperor Gallipoli, the rich coastal plains of Thrace, Thessaly, and the Black Sea coasts, thus restoring the Byzantine empire to its boundaries prior to Bayazid I's conquests. The Turkish dynasties in Anatolia, which Timur had restored to their principalities, also rebelled against Murad II. The young sultan had to recognize the occupation of Hamid-ili by the Karamanids. Juneyd,

89. See patriarch Matthias's letter, end of 1399, *ibid.*, pp. 203–205.

90. Thiriet, *Régestes*, II, no. 981.

91. See Iorga, *Notes et extraits*, I, 105–106, 115.

92. On Timur's campaign see Alexandrescu-Dersca, *La Campagne de Timur en Anatolie (1402)*.

93. For Murad II see Inalcik, "Murād II," *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, VIII (Istanbul, 1960), 598–615.

a pretender to the principality of Smyrna, had joined Mustafa in Rumelia. The Ottoman state was again in danger of dissolution.

Under the circumstances, Murad's government at Bursa followed the same conciliatory policy with the Christian states as his father's had in 1413. It was ready to accept all the Byzantine demands, except the surrender to the emperor of Gallipoli and of Mehmed's two infant sons as hostages. Murad made agreements with Serbia and Hungary through his ambassadors as his father Mehmed I had done against Musa, his rival in Rumelia in 1413. Venice approached both sides to make the most of the situation. It wanted Venetian merchants to receive the same treatment that they enjoyed in Constantinople and an export permit for 10,000 *modii* (about 20,000 tons) of wheat annually from the Ottoman possessions.<sup>94</sup>

In the final encounter near Bursa (end of January or early February 1422), Mustafa lost the day as a result of the defection of the frontier begs and of Juneyd, whom Murad recognized as sovereign in Smyrna. With the Genoese ships brought by John Adorno, podestà of New Phocaea, Murad was able to cross the Dardanelles and capture and execute his uncle in Adrianople.<sup>95</sup>

In the spring the victorious sultan came to lay siege to Constantinople. Supported by guns and a navy, this siege, from June 20 to September 6, 1422, was the most serious theretofore made against the Byzantine capital. Venice was alarmed, and took measures to protect its merchant ships trading with the Black Sea ports from Ottoman naval forces. However, the proposal of a naval demonstration against the sultan before Constantinople was rejected by the senate. At this point the cautious doge Thomas Mocenigo (1414-1423) tried to avoid a war against the Ottomans. His bailie in Constantinople, Benedict Emo, was instructed to offer mediation for peace negotiations between the sultan and the emperor.<sup>96</sup> At any rate, military aid to Byzantium under siege could not be sent before the following spring. But help came to Byzantium from Anatolia. The Germiyanids, Karamanids, and Jandarids responded favorably to a Byzantine diplomatic move for an attack on the Ottoman territories in Anatolia. These Anatolian emirs convinced Ilyas, the tutor of Murad II's brother Mustafa, who was then only thirteen years old and living in Germiyan, to rebel and sent forces to support him.<sup>97</sup> Upon hearing the news, following an unsus-

94. Thiriet, *Régestes*, II, no. 1825, instructions to Benedict Emo dated October 10, 1421.

95. Inalcik, "Murād II," p. 60.

96. Thiriet, *Régestes*, II, nos. 1854, 1855, dated August 26, 1422.

97. A newly discovered Ottoman source, Osman Turan, *Tarihî Takvîmler* (Ankara, 1954), pp. 20, 60, is particularly important for the younger Mustafa's activities; cf. Ducas, tr. Magoulias,

cessful final assault on August 26, the sultan lifted the siege of Constantinople.

The Ottoman threat had led Manuel II to seek closer relations with the west, and in particular with pope Martin V (1417–1431). In response the pope sent messages to various western rulers requesting aid to Byzantium, and his legate, the Franciscan Anthony of Massa, arrived in Constantinople on September 10, 1422, to negotiate church union, but these negotiations were not fruitful. More practical results were expected from diplomatic contacts with Venice and Hungary.

Since 1411 Sigismund, “emperor of the Romans and king of Hungary”, had championed the deliverance of Balkan Christians and Byzantium,<sup>98</sup> and since 1416 Manuel II had been trying to reconcile Hungary and Venice for the purpose of starting a crusade against the Ottomans. In this effort, Manuel was joined by king Vladislav II Jagiello of Poland (1386–1434), who had received the Byzantine ambassador Philanthropenos in August 1420.<sup>99</sup>

Actually, Venice shrewdly made the most of the crisis of 1421–1423. In the wake of the Ottoman siege of Constantinople, the senate agreed to strengthen the Byzantine fleet by ten galleys (October 1422). In the Morea, Venetians sought to take over the remnants of the Frankish principalities<sup>100</sup> and threatened to join the Greeks in order to hold the Ottoman forces at the newly constructed Hexamilion wall on the isthmus.<sup>101</sup> In the spring of 1423 Murad was still threatening the Byzantine empire. Now free of challenges from his rivals in Anatolia and his brother Mustafa (late January 1423) Murad sent Turakhan, the powerful frontier beg in Thessaly, to invade the Morea on May 22, 1423, and destroy the Hexamilion fortifications.<sup>102</sup> Turakhan’s cam-

p. 164; Iorga, *Notes et extraits*, I, 324; *idem*, “Sur les deux Prétendants Mustafa,” *Revue historique du sud-est européen*, X (1933), 12–13.

98. Barker, *Manuel II*, pp. 327–329, 369.

99. *Ibid.*, pp. 336–339.

100. Setton, *The Papacy*, II (Philadelphia, 1978), 12–14.

101. Barker, *Manuel II*, pp. 310–314.

102. *Ibid.*, p. 369, note 121; see especially “*Tarihî Takvîmler*.” Defeated by the forces sent by Murad II under Mihal-oghlu, Murad’s brother Mustafa took refuge in Constantinople (September 30, 1422). With the emperor’s support he went to Selymbria (Silivri), apparently hoping for coöperation from dissidents in Rumelia. But under the attack of the Rumelian forces, he retreated to Koja-ili (the Nicomedia area) where he was recognized as sultan. Nicaea (Iznik) opened its gates to him. Mustafa threatened Bursa, and seems to have established his control over the greater part of Ottoman Anatolia. On the advice of his tutor Yörgüj Pasha, Murad II set out from Adrianople and attacked Mustafa in Nicaea in winter. Taken by surprise and betrayed by his tutor Ilyas, Mustafa was captured and executed (February 20, 1423). Murad’s forces had to fight against the Jandarid and Karamanid forces during his action against Mustafa.

paign was apparently a move to discourage an attack on the rear of the Ottomans, who were now concentrating their forces on Thessalonica, which had been under blockade since the spring of 1422. But, to the disappointment of the Ottomans, Thessalonica, the second city of the Byzantine empire, passed by agreement under Venetian sovereignty on September 14, 1423. Since the city had been under Ottoman rule from 1387 to 1402, and paid a tribute of 100,000 *akcha* to the sultans while under the Byzantine rule thereafter, the Ottomans considered the Venetian occupation a hostile act. The Venetian ambassador, Nicholas Giorgio, sent to make an agreement, was arrested in the winter of 1424, and the Venetian offer to pay a tribute of 1,500-2,000 ducats for the city was rejected. An Ottoman army estimated to consist of five thousand men was holding the city under siege.

The Venetian-Ottoman war for Thessalonica lasted seven years, with dangerous implications for the Ottomans. While on the one hand the republic made several diplomatic attempts to have the sultan recognize the Venetian occupation of Thessalonica in return for some concessions and payment of tribute,<sup>103</sup> on the other hand it tried to instigate a crusade or form a regional coalition against the Ottomans. A Venetian fleet under Peter Loredan was at Gallipoli in June 1424, blocking the Straits to all Ottoman ships.

To divert Ottoman forces, Venice then encouraged Juneyd in the Smyrna area to rise against Murad. The Ottoman sultan had difficult times in his war against this energetic fighter, who attempted to raise the Karamanids and other emirs in Anatolia against the Ottomans. Given this dangerous situation, Murad had to sign a peace treaty with Byzantium (February 22, 1424) which accepted payment of a yearly tribute of 300,000 *akcha* (about 10,000 gold ducats) and the return of lands occupied since 1402 on the coasts of the Marmara, Aegean, and Black Seas except the castles of Mesembria, Derkos, and Zeitounion (Lamia).

In collaboration with Venice, Juneyd planned to send Ismail, an Ottoman pretender, to Rumelia, but Murad again secured Genoese co-operation to blockade Juneyd from the sea. Juneyd's elimination in 1425 deprived Venice of an efficient ally. In the spring of 1425 the Ottoman-Venetian war flared up on the Thessalonica front. The Venetians occupied Cassandra and Kavalla and at the same time attempted to use a "false" Mustafa as a pretender to the throne. In 1426 the Ot-

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For Turakhan's raid into the Morea see Iorga, *Notes et extraits*, I, 497, and Peter Topping's account in volume III of the present work, p. 164; cf. Setton, *ibid.*, III, 269.

103. See Setton, *The Papacy*, II, 22-26.



toman corsairs from Palatia (Balat) and Ephesus (Ayasoluk) struck Euboea, Modon, and Coron while war spread in Albania with the Ottoman siege of Durazzo.

During the crisis of 1421–1424, the Ottoman frontier lords on the Danube and in Macedonia, southern Bosnia, and Albania had been able to protect Ottoman interests in the buffer zones against Hungary and Venice. During this period, while the buffer states—the Serbian despotate, the kingdom of Bosnia, and the voivodate of Wallachia—were forced to accept suzerainty or give up strategic points to Hungary and Venice, the Ottoman frontier lords had supported rival parties or pretenders in these buffer states and intensified their raids into these countries.

Coupled with the energetic stand of the Ottoman frontier lords, the war between Hungary and Venice for Dalmatia relieved the Ottomans of the danger of a “crusade” in the Balkans during this period.

Venice, however, became the principal beneficiary of the changing conditions in the Balkans. In addition to having seized the Dalmatian ports of Zara, Spalato (Split), Sebenico (Shibenik), and Traù (Trogir) from Hungary between 1412 and 1420, the republic had extended its sway in northern Albania and Montenegro following the death of Balsha in 1421. This policy had led Venice into war against Stephen Lazarevich, the Serbian despot, in the years 1421–1423.<sup>104</sup> In this fight Stephen found Ottoman frontier forces an efficient ally, and from then on he recognized Murad as his suzerain. By the peace treaty signed on August 12, 1423, however, the despot had to recognize Venetian occupation of Scutari, Alessio (Lesh), and Dulcigno. Later, in 1426, the Ottoman frontier lord Ilyas Beg was included in the treaty as a witness or guarantor.<sup>105</sup> This expansion of Venetian control can be considered as a counter to the Ottoman expansion in Albania—the occupation of Croia (Akchahisar) in 1415, and that of Avlona, Berat, and Pyrgos in 1420.

Hungary also exploited the situation by reinforcing its position in Serbia, Bosnia, and Wallachia in the period 1419–1429. During this period Sigismund was particularly active in extending Hungarian control in the northern Balkans and lower Danubian basin, even claiming sway over northern Bulgaria by supporting a Bulgarian prince’s claim to the throne.

104. Iorga, *Geschichte*, I, 394; Stanojević, “Die Biographie Stefan Lazarevićs,” pp. 459–470.

105. Ilyas Beg may be Ilyas, *subashi* of Chartalos near Berat; see *Sûret-i defter-i sancak-i Arvanid*, ed. Inalcik, timar no. 261.

Mircea had died in 1418 and his sons Michael and then Dan II recognized Hungarian suzerainty in Wallachia. The situation apparently caused great concern in Murad's court, and the sultan ordered frontier forces to support Radu II ("the Simple", or "the Bald"), another son of Mircea, against his brother, culminating in the invasion of Wallachia in 1423.<sup>106</sup> Hungarians and Ottomans fought on the Danube as supporters of their respective candidates for the Wallachian throne. Following his attempt at an agreement in 1424, the sultan, now freed of his Anatolian enemies, organized a large-scale campaign against Wallachia and Hungary under the beglerbeg of Rumelia with the participation of all the frontier lords. At the head of his army, Sigismund himself encountered the Ottoman army at Golubats and Orshova, and blocked their way.<sup>107</sup> The Venetians in Thessalonica received with joy the news of the Ottoman failure on the Danube.<sup>108</sup>

Upon the termination of the truce in 1426, the Ottoman-Hungarian rivalry over Wallachia and Serbia escalated. First the Ottomans drove Dan away from Wallachia early in 1427, and Sigismund had to come to reinstate him on the Wallachian throne in the spring. His forces then retook Giurgiu and crossed the Danube. There Sigismund built the fortress Szentgyörgy, and settled German forces as a barrier against the Ottomans. At this point, the death of the Serbian despot Stephen Lazarevich on July 19, 1427, and the dispute over his heritage brought the rivalry of the two powers on the Danube to a point of crisis. Stephen had arranged his succession in favor of George Brankovich, lord of upper Serbia, under Hungarian protection; Brankovich would be a vassal of the Hungarian king, by an agreement signed in May 1426.<sup>109</sup> According to the agreement upon the death of Stephen, Hungary would inherit Belgrade, Golubats, and the banat of Machva on the west side of the Danube. Even before the death of Stephen in 1427, the Ottomans had reacted against this arrangement and, by invading George's lands, had forced him to recognize Ottoman suzerainty, to cede the area between Krushevats and Kossovo, to wed his daughter Mara to

106. Anonymous, *Tevârih-i Âl-i 'Othmân* (Paris, Bibl. nat., MS. suppl. turc, 1047), p. 38, tells us that following the execution of his brother Mustafa (early 1423) Murad II ordered a massive attack against Wallachia, and that he then made peace with "Drakula" on condition of the payment of a tribute; according to Iorga, *Geschichte*, I, 390, Ottoman forces advanced as far as Kronstadt (Brashov).

107. Sigismund was at Orshova on August 16, 1425; Iorga, *Geschichte*, I, 391. The anonymous *Tevârih* claims an Ottoman surprise attack and victory at Golubats against the king's forces in 828/1425.

108. Iorga, *Geschichte*, I, 391.

109. Jireček, *Geschichte der Serben*, II, 159; Ignaz A. Fessler, *Geschichte von Ungarn*, ed. Ernst Klein, II (Leipzig, 1869), 372-373.

the sultan, and to guarantee coöperation against the Hungarians.<sup>110</sup> The Ottomans, in return, had promised George military aid against his rival, king Tvrtko II of Bosnia, who had laid siege to Srebrenitsa.

In the summer of 1427, frontier forces under Ishak Beg of Skoplje staged a raid into Bosnia, and went as far as Croatia. Under the pressure of the Ottoman frontier forces Tvrtko II had accepted Hungarian protection since 1422,<sup>111</sup> and now demanded aid. After the death of Stephen in July, the Ottomans and Hungarians moved to invade Serbia to prevent each other from taking over the land. While Sigismund occupied Belgrade in the autumn of 1427, the Ottoman forces invaded upper Serbia, capturing Krushevats and Golubats, as well as the island of "Jan-adasi" (identified as New Orshova) in the Danube. As noted above, Murad had already forced Brankovich, the new Serbian despot (1427-1456), to recognize Ottoman suzerainty, and to pay tribute. But now the despot chose as his heir Frederick of Cilly, Sigismund's son-in-law.<sup>112</sup>

When military action around Thessalonica was intensified, the Venetian senate had accepted the necessity of an alliance with Hungary (October 1425). Now not only Byzantium but also Florence<sup>113</sup> and Savoy, as well as Poland, urged Hungary to reach an agreement with Venice.

Sigismund organized his conquests into two *banats* (military frontier provinces), Machva and Belgrade, against the Ottomans. Opposite Golubats (Galambócz), now in Ottoman hands, he built the fortress Lászlóvár.<sup>114</sup> Thus a strong defense line was created against the Ottomans from Giurgiu on the lower Danube to Severin, while Wallachian, Serbian, and Bosnian princes recognized the protection and suzerainty of the Hungarian king. Sigismund once again emerged as the champion of a crusade against the Ottomans. Planning his crowning as emperor in Rome, he declared his determination to reach a full agreement with the pope to achieve peace and unity in Italy so that he could eradicate the Hussite heresy, and, as an ultimate goal, could fight against the Ottomans and deliver the Holy Land.<sup>115</sup>

110. The main source is Neshri, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-162.

111. In 1410 Sigismund entered Bosnia and was crowned "king of Bosnia and Serbia"; see Jireček, *Geschichte der Serben*, II, 147.

112. Fessler, *op. cit.*, II, 374. Frederick succeeded his father Hermann II in 1435 and died in 1454.

113. Beckmann, *Der Kampf*, pp. 92-93; see Iorga, *Notes et extraits*, I, 351-357, 409-410; Setton, *The Papacy*, II, 25; Barker, *Manuel II*, pp. 375-379.

114. Fessler, *op. cit.*, II, 374.

115. For his words to the Florentine embassy in September 1427, see Beckmann, *Der Kampf*, p. 92.

In April 1428 a strong army of twenty-five to thirty thousand Hungarians and six thousand Wallachians under voivode Dan II, as well as Lithuanian contingents, arrived before Golubats. The Turkish fleet on the Danube was eliminated. Murad rushed with fresh forces to the aid of the hard-pressed Golubats, and Sigismund decided not to risk a pitched battle as he had done at Nicopolis in 1396.

A cease-fire for the retreat of the Hungarian army to the west side of the Danube was agreed upon early in June 1428. Continued negotiations eventually resulted in a three-year truce between the two powers. While Sigismund took pains to explain to Venice and pope Martin V his reasons for making peace with Murad, the Ottoman sultan in his turn tried to prove to sultan Barsbay of Egypt (1422-1438) that the peace was necessary and that Serbia and Bosnia were once again forced to recognize Islamic overlordship.<sup>116</sup>

The Ottomans now controlled Serbia through their strongholds of Golubats and Krushevats, as well as Ishak Beg's forces in Skoplje. Brankovich built for himself a new capital at Smederevo (Semendria) between Golubats and Belgrade,<sup>117</sup> and accepted full vassalage to the sultan — payment of a yearly tribute of 50,000 gold ducats and provision of an auxiliary force of two thousand for the sultan's expeditions.

Sigismund, taking advantage of the Ottoman crisis and the intensification of the Ottoman pressure on the buffer states, resumed in the period 1421-1428 efforts to realize the plan of a Danubian empire originated by Louis the Great. The struggle resulted in a compromise, or rather a postponement of the question, because of the powerful Ottoman reaction. The Ottomans, when they found themselves in a better position, would resume their aggressive policy in the region against Hungary, and this would give rise to a series of crusading activities in the west, on Hungarian initiative.

Disappointed by the armistice between the Hungarians and the Turks, Venice's hopes revived when new developments threatened the Ottomans on their eastern borders. During the Ottoman siege of Golubats the Karamanids, apparently in collaboration with Hungary,<sup>118</sup> had moved against the Ottomans, forcing Murad to surrender the much-disputed Hamid area. Through the mediation of the king of Cyprus, Janus (1398-1432), Venice entered into negotiations for an alliance

116. The sultan's letter is in Ferîdûn, *op. cit.*, I, 303-305.

117. The anonymous *Tevârikh* gives the date as 831 (October 22, 1427-November 11, 1428).

118. István Katona, *Historia critica . . . regum Hungariae: Stirpis mixtae* (12 vols., Pest et alibi, 1778-1810), V, 505, cited by Iorga, *Notes et extraits*, I, 505.

with the Karamanids.<sup>119</sup> But the most disturbing news for the Ottomans was the campaign of Shāhrukh, son of Timur, in Anatolia, which gave rise to great expectations throughout Christian Europe. Since 1416 Shāhrukh (1405–1447) had showed his determination to sustain the status quo established by Timur in Anatolia and not let the Ottomans press and annex the Anatolian emirates, those of the Karamanids and Jandarids in particular. The contemporary sources attribute to him a grandiose plan to invade the Ottoman dominions in Anatolia and Rumelia and return to Azerbaijan via Moldavia and Kaffa.<sup>120</sup> But in 1429, when he invaded eastern Anatolia, his immediate concern was to crush the rising power of the Turcoman Karakoyunlu there, which threatened Timurid rule in Azerbaijan.

The common danger brought the Ottomans and Mamluks much closer to each other. Apart from the Timurid threat, the project of a Karamanid-Cypriote-Venetian alliance was against the interests of the Mamluks, who had invaded Cyprus in 1426 and made king Janus a vassal, while the Karamanids were considered to be under Mamluk protection. At any rate, this Mamluk-Ottoman rapprochement would continue in the future, and turn against western Christendom, Rhodes in particular, in the coming decades.

On March 29, 1429, Venice finally declared war against the Ottomans, whose growing naval power and continual attacks on Euboea and other Venetian possessions in the Aegean had become distressing. By early March a Turkish fleet had appeared before Thessalonica.<sup>121</sup> The senate believed that the Ottomans had decided to finish this dispute once and for all.

During the long struggle for Thessalonica, the Ottoman tactics consisted of naval attacks on the Venetian possessions and merchant marine in the Aegean,<sup>122</sup> while sustaining a long blockade which aimed to force the city to surrender by ruining its trade and starving its inhabitants, a tactic successfully used by the Ottomans against other cities with strong fortifications and large populations since the fall of Bursa

119. Iorga, *Geschichte*, I, 406; *idem*, *Notes et extraits*, I, 502; the senate's decision is dated August 30, 1424.

120. Ferīdūn, *op. cit.*, I, 152.

121. Iorga, *Notes et extraits*, I, 486–488; the Ottomans succeeded in capturing two Venetian ships; the report is dated March 29, 1429. Venice, at this time, attempted to use the false "Mustafa", pretender to the Ottoman throne, in Thessalonica to cause defections in Murad's army; see *ibid.*, I, 489–490, dated May 10, 1429.

122. The Ottoman attack on Euboea, Modon, and Coron in the spring of 1428 was particularly destructive, reminiscent of the raids of Umur Pasha in the previous century; see Setton, *The Papacy*, II, 37.

in 1326. As vividly reflected in Venetian correspondence, Venice had to feed the city by sea, mainly from Crete, and eventually the starving populace turned against their new masters. The Ottomans had sympathizers and supporters among the Greeks, especially the Greek clergy.

Venetian tactics were to cut off the Ottomans' passage between Anatolia and Rumelia at the Dardanelles, to support the Karamanids, and to chase the Ottoman fleet away from Thessalonica.<sup>123</sup> In June 1429 the senate offered Sigismund a new project of alliance with emphasis on the occupation of the Dardanelles and Gallipoli.<sup>124</sup> During the summer and autumn Murad had to watch with anxiety Shāhrukh's movements on his borders in Anatolia, and be content with the raids of his frontier forces in the Morea and Albania, while the Venetian fleet under Andrew Mocenigo threatened Gallipoli.

Shāhrukh's victory against the Karakoyunlu in the battle of Salmas on September 17-18, 1429, emboldened the Venetians, who reminded Murad of the danger from the east.<sup>125</sup> Shāhrukh returned to Azerbaijan for the winter, and Murad called the Anatolian forces under the able general Hamza, conqueror of Smyrna, to Europe in February 1430. Thessalonica was taken on March 29, 1430. In his letter to his friend the Mamluk sultan Barsbay, Murad II presented it as a victory for Islam, and considered it as the elimination of a great danger to the Ottoman state.<sup>126</sup>

The fall of Thessalonica came as a surprise to the Venetians; Silvestro Morosini was then cruising off the coast of Epirus. In the summer of 1430, while Shāhrukh was still in Azerbaijan, the Venetian fleet attacked Gallipoli and cut off all communications on the Straits. Acting on behalf of the sultan, Hamza signed a peace treaty in July 1430 (ratification September 4, 1430). Venice recognized the Ottoman possession of Thessalonica, and guaranteed security for Ottoman communications on the Straits. By agreeing to pay a yearly tribute of 236 ducats Venice also recognized Ottoman overlordship at Patras, where Latin rule was challenged by the Greeks and Turks. For his part, the sultan recognized Venetian sovereignty over its Albanian possessions—Durazzo, Scutari, and Antivari (Bar). Seven years of occupation of Thessalonica and the resulting Ottoman war had cost the republic over 700,000 ducats.

123. Iorga, *Notes et extraits*, I, 490, instructions to the captain-general Andrew Mocenigo, dated May 15, 1429; for the Karamanids see *ibid.*, I, 503.

124. *Ibid.*, I, 494.

125. *Ibid.*, I, 505, note 5.

126. Ferīdūn, *op. cit.*, I, 198.

The capture of Thessalonica marked the resumption of an aggressive Ottoman policy in the Balkans, the first goal being the strengthening of their rule in Albania and Epirus. The despotate of Ianina (Yanya) was occupied, and Charles II Tocco accepted Ottoman suzerainty over Arta in 1430, while Venice took the Ionian islands of Leucas (Santa Maura), Zante, and Cephalonia under its protection.

In the following year Turakhan made his power over the Morea felt by demolishing the Hexamilion fortifications once again. But Albania would be the main arena of the Ottoman-Venetian rivalry in the ensuing half century. So close to Italy and so vitally important for Venetian communication with the world outside the Adriatic Sea, Albania received sustained attention and support from Venice, Naples, and the papacy against the establishment of Ottoman rule, and this support—in addition to the particular characteristics of the land and people—was responsible for the long and stiff resistance the Ottomans encountered.

Albania was considered by the Ottomans as a base to invade Italy and by the Italian states as their first defense line and as a bridgehead for a crusade against the Ottomans. During the fifteenth century the papacy's growing concern and zeal to organize crusades against the Ottomans was more related to the direct Ottoman threat to the papal states than to the deliverance of the Holy Land. The Aragonese kings of Naples fought in Albania against the Ottomans for their own security from the 1430's on,<sup>127</sup> and an Ottoman invasion of the Ancona area was felt to be an imminent danger throughout the second half of the fifteenth century. It was, however, the Venetians' naval superiority, as well as their building of strong defense lines on the islands in the Adriatic and Ionian seas and along the Albanian coasts, that really deterred the Ottomans from an invasion and gave a sense of security to the Italians. The Ottomans almost never planned or attempted an invasion of Italy without first eliminating the Venetian factor either by an agreement or by direct occupation of the Venetian bases in the area. Interestingly enough, throughout this period from 1430 on Ottoman diplomacy tried to further its Albanian policy by taking advantage of dissensions among the Italian states, between Venice and Milan or between the papacy and Venice or Naples. In any event, the period from 1430 to 1479 witnessed a crucial struggle between Venice and the Ottomans for the control of the Albanian coasts, the first defense line of Venice and Italy.

Thanks to an unusual wealth of documentation on Albania from

127. See Cerone, "La Politica orientale di Alfonso di Aragona," *loc. cit.*; Marinescu, "Alphonse V," pp. 7-135.

the Italian archives for this period,<sup>128</sup> and to the recently discovered Ottoman surveys of the country,<sup>129</sup> we are now able to evaluate the Italian involvement as well as internal conditions of the Albanian insurrections from 1432 on. Following their conquest of Thessalonica and Ianina the Ottomans made a survey of Albania in 1431-1432. The Ottoman survey book of 1432, which includes additional entries down to the mid-fifteenth century, shows that several Albanian seigneurial families were deprived of part of their lands, which were given to the Ottoman timar-holders, and Albanian clans in general resented being subjected to Ottoman taxation and the control of a centralist administration. Since the Ottomans could not establish complete control of the seacoast, and since Venetians gave refuge and aid to the rebels, rebellion became endemic in Albania in this period. But the actual situation was much more complex because Albanian lords shifted their loyalty between Venice and the Ottomans according to circumstances. Moreover, as was the case in the Morea, Serbia, and Bosnia, the Ottoman frontier begs in Albania acted as local lords, and achieved a kind of political equilibrium in the region.

During the Thessalonica war the northern Albanian lord John Castriota, father of Scanderbeg, had accepted Venetian protection, but after the fall of Thessalonica the Ottomans forced him to recognize the sultan's overlordship. The rebellion in southern Albania, apparently a direct outcome of the Ottoman survey of 1432, proved to be much more serious.<sup>130</sup> Under the leadership of local lords Thopia Zenevisi and George Araniti, whose lands had been given to Ottoman soldiers, a series of insurrections broke out in the coastal and mountainous areas, and Ottoman timar-holding sipahis were massacred. Despite several repressions at the hands of the Ottoman frontier begs, Albanian rebellion simmered until 1443, when Scanderbeg turned against the Ottomans and took on the leadership of the Albanian resistance.<sup>131</sup>

Emerging at a time when Christian Europe was ardently preparing for a crusade to drive out the Ottomans from the Balkans, Scanderbeg was destined to become the symbol of the crusade (once a Moslem, he had returned to Christianity), and later, after his successful guerilla warfare against the Ottomans, and defeating four armies under the sultans in 1448, 1450, 1466, and 1467, he would be acclaimed

128. See Valentini, *Acta albanica veneta*, vols. XV-XX.

129. The Ottoman survey of Albania dated 1432 is printed in *Sûret-i defter-i sancak-i Arvanid*, ed. Inalcik.

130. See Inalcik, "Arnavutluk'ta Osmanlı Hakimiyetinin yerleşmesi ve Iskender Bey İsyanının Menşei," *Fâtih ve İstanbul*, I-2 (1953), 152-175.

131. For Scanderbeg see Inalcik, "Iskender Beg," pp. 138-140.



throughout Italy as the defender of the faith and of Europe. In 1450 pope Nicholas V (1447–1455) called on all the Christian powers to assist him. Scanderbeg finally had to acknowledge the suzerainty of king Alfonso I of Naples (March 26, 1451) and agree to hand Croia over to the king's forces. In 1457 pope Calixtus III appointed Scanderbeg "captain-general of the Holy See". But historical reality was far from the Christian or humanistic Europe's image of him. Most of the time he acted as a mercenary or clan chief subsidized by Venice, the king of Naples, or the pope. Also, far from achieving national unity, he restricted his sphere of activity to northern Albania. Once, in 1438, an Ottoman *subashi* of Croia himself, he had rebelled against the sultan in 1443 to recover his father's domains, when the Ottoman sovereignty in the Balkans was on the verge of collapse. Scanderbeg's ambition was often challenged by other Albanian clan chiefs, resulting in local feuds.

While the Ottomans and the Italian powers, including the papacy, confronted each other in the sensitive area of Albania, the real front of the struggle between Christian Europe and the Ottoman empire was the middle Danube, though these two fronts were often connected, as when in 1434 Sigismund made contact with the defeated Albanian lords. Later, in 1448, John Hunyadi would try to combine his operations in the Balkans with Scanderbeg's. After the capture of Thessalonica, the Ottoman pressure had increased to strengthen Turkish control of the buffer states of Wallachia, Serbia, and Bosnia. Through his embassy in 1431, Sigismund had in his turn asked the sultan to recognize his overlordship of these countries.

In 1434 the Hungarian king got the upper hand in the struggle for supremacy by receiving in his court the allegiance of the rulers of Serbia and Bosnia, and the king's protégé, Vlad II "the Devil" (or "the Dragon", Dracul), replaced the Ottoman favorite, his brother Aldea, in Wallachia. The following year Shāhrukh's renewed campaign against the Karakoyunlu in eastern Anatolia and the Karamanid attack against the Ottomans were most encouraging news for the king.<sup>132</sup> Shāhrukh invited all the Anatolian emirs, including Murad II, to recognize his overlordship in July 1435. To punish the Karamanids, Murad waited for the return of Shāhrukh with his powerful army to Central Asia.

Sigismund died January 9, 1437, and Hungary plunged into an internal crisis over the succession. A terrible peasant insurrection against excessive exploitation by feudal lords broke out in Transylvania in the

132. Iorga, *Geschichte*, I, 417.

spring of 1437, culminating in the battle of Bobalna. Ottoman pressure was one of the excuses to increase the tax burden on the peasantry. The Ottomans thought it was time to attack and restore their power in the middle Danube against Hungary. In 1438 the sultan himself at the head of his army invaded Hungary. According to an Ottoman document<sup>133</sup> Murad crossed the Danube at the Kamen, near Vidin, bombarded Severin, attacked Mehadia and Mühlenbach, and after following the river Maros (Muresh) laid siege to Hermannstadt (Szeben), the center of Transylvania, while his raiders forayed all over the land. He returned through Wallachia and crossed the Danube at Giurgiu. In this campaign the Serbian and Wallachian princes, as loyal vassals, led the Ottoman army. The Transylvanian peasantry profited from the Ottoman invasion to take up arms against their rulers again in 1438.<sup>134</sup>

Believing that Hungarian resistance had collapsed, the Ottomans occupied the Serbian despotate; Smederevo fell August 27, 1439, and the frontier beg Isa of Skoplje laid siege to Yajtse (Jajce), capital city of Bosnia, and forced king Tvrtko II to pay a yearly tribute of 2,500 ducats. The Serbian silver mines at Novo Brdo, vitally important for supplying silver to Italy via Ragusa, were captured by the Ottomans, and in 1439 the export of silver to the west was prohibited.<sup>135</sup> In 1440 Murad II, in order to crown his successes, attempted to capture Belgrade, the gate to central Europe, which had been occupied and fortified by the Hungarians since 1427. His defeat at Belgrade and the emergence of John Hunyadi swung the pendulum in the reverse direction. Hunyadi reorganized the Hungarian frontier forces, and, perhaps more important, took into his service Hussite mercenary troops who with their *wagenburg* tactics were to revolutionize warfare in the Balkans. Ottoman raiders, invading Transylvania under the frontier lord Mezid, were crushed in 1441, and the reinforced Ottoman army of Rumelia under the beglerbeg Shehâbeddin, which was sent to make up for the defeat in the following year, failed miserably. Hunyadi's victories set off vibrations throughout Christian Europe and heightened the crusading spirit in the west.<sup>136</sup>

133. Inalcik, "Byzantium and the Origins of the Crisis of 1444 under the Light of Turkish Sources," *Actes du XIIe Congrès international des études byzantines*, II (Belgrade, 1964), 159-163.

134. Stefan Pasco, *La Révolte populaire de Transylvanie des années 1437-1438* (Bucharest, 1964), pp. 34-107.

135. The Ottoman conquest of Novo Brdo, a center of silver production, took place on June 27, 1441; see Jireček, *Geschichte der Serben*, II, 178.

136. Pope Eugenius IV (1431-1447) celebrated the victories entailing "a vast slaughter of the infidels" as signs of God's clemency for Christians; see Setton, *The Papacy*, II, 68.

The negotiations for the union of the Greek church with Rome and for a crusade were taken up in Rome more zealously than ever when, in the wake of the fall of Thessalonica, the Byzantines had serious fears of the Ottoman capture of Constantinople. The Golden Horn was then closed off by the chain at its entrance. Emperor John VIII Palaeologus (1425–1448) himself left for Italy on November 24, 1437, to attend the council in Ferrara (and then, from February 1439 on, in Florence) and finally to conclude the union of the Latin Catholic and Greek Orthodox churches. This time high dignitaries of the Greek church, including the patriarch Joseph II, accompanied the emperor. The union of the churches was declared in Florence on July 6, 1439. For the crusade, the real objective of the Greeks, a plan was offered to the council by John Torcello (or Torzello), the emperor's "chambellan".<sup>137</sup> In their efforts to persuade the west to launch a crusade, the Greeks claimed that to defeat the Ottomans it was sufficient to invade the Balkans with a crusading army of 80,000. In the Balkans, he added, not only would the regular forces of the Serbian despotate, the Greeks of the Morea, and the Albanians join the crusaders, but also Christian soldiers in the service of the sultan, 50,000 in number, would desert to the side of the west. According to Torcello, the bulk of the Ottoman soldiery were not as well armed as the westerners. To sell the project the Greeks further asserted that the recovery of the Holy Land would be an easy task for the westerners after the Ottomans' defeat.<sup>138</sup>

The union was the decision of the ruling elite, who saw the sole hope for the salvation of Byzantium in full coöperation with the west. It was, however, a decisive step which opened a critical period ending with the fall of Byzantium.<sup>139</sup> Thus far the emperors, anticipating the protests of the conservative Orthodox masses and a strong reaction on the part of the Ottomans, had acted with caution on this matter. As soon as John VIII was back in Constantinople, the sultan sent an envoy to inquire about what had occurred in Florence. The emperor tried to conceal the real political objective of the union,<sup>140</sup> but as is clear from the contemporary Ottoman sources<sup>141</sup> the Ottomans were fully aware of the negotiations for preparation of a crusade against

137. On Torcello see *ibid.*, II, 68, note 103.

138. Torcello's report is in Bertrandon of La Brocquière, ed. Schefer, and see La Brocquière's criticisms, pp. 263–274; cf. Setton, *The Papacy*, II, 69, note 107.

139. Sphrantzes, ed. Bekker, p. 173; ed. Vasile Grecu (Bucharest, 1966), p. 178.

140. Ducas, *op. cit.*, tr. Magoulias, p. 181.

141. *Ghazavât-i Sultân Murâd*, pp. 2–4; see also Ferîdûn, *op. cit.*, I, 613–614, and Paris, Bibl. nat., MS. arabe no. 4434, fols. 133<sup>v</sup>–138<sup>v</sup>.

themselves, and from this time on a strong party, mostly from among the military leaders, claimed that unless Byzantium were eliminated there would be no security and no future for the Ottoman state. In *Ghazavât-i Sultan Murâd*, a recently discovered, well-informed account of the events between 1439 and 1444, the crusades of 1443 and 1444, as well as the Karamanid attacks in Anatolia, are all attributed originally to the activities of Byzantine diplomacy. Though basically reflecting the view of the anti-Byzantine party, the claim is largely confirmed by our western sources, which tell us about activities of Byzantine diplomats in Rome, Venice, and Buda in those years.<sup>142</sup>

Hungary, exposed directly to Ottoman attacks after the Ottoman occupation of Serbia, was prepared, under the leadership of the regent John Hunyadi, to launch a decisive war against the Ottomans. In their efforts toward this end, the Hungarian aristocracy agreed in 1440 to have Ladislas (Vladislav III), king of Poland, as their king (László IV), provided that he vigorously pursue the struggle against the Ottomans. Hungary found that Byzantium was equally interested in the launching of a general crusade. As early as February 1442 the Byzantine envoy, John Torzello, was in Venice with the mission of visiting Buda, Rome, and other European capitals for the realization of such a crusade.<sup>143</sup> Once the union was realized pope Eugenius IV (1431-1447) showed great enthusiasm for the crusade. In February 1442 he appointed cardinal Julian Cesarini as papal legate to Hungary; on January 1, 1443, he invited the Christian rulers to a general crusade against the Ottomans, and in May 1443 he named his nephew Francis Condulmer commander of the fleet to coöperate with the crusader army from Hungary.<sup>144</sup> Although Venice was typically cautious enough not to engage in a direct conflict with the Ottomans, it was supporting the preparations, and agreed to build a crusading fleet of ten galleys when funds were made available.<sup>145</sup>

Encouraged by the Ottoman reverses in the Balkans and by the Byzantine emperor,<sup>146</sup> the Karamanid Ibrahim Beg had made raids into the disputed territory of Akshehir (Philomelium) and Beyshehir in late 1442, and again in the spring of 1443. Murad II forced him to sign

142. See Iorga, *Notes et extraits*, II (Paris, 1899), index, p. 580, s.v. Jean VIII Paléologue; Halecki, *The Crusade of Varna*, pp. 32-82. Halecki tries to prove that there was no confirmation by king Ladislas of Hungary at Szegedin of the treaty of Adrianople of June 12, 1444. Dąbrowski, "L'Année 1444," was critical of Halecki's thesis, and *Ghazavât-i Sultân Murâd* now supplies Ottoman evidence that Halecki is incorrect; see below, note 149.

143. Iorga, *Notes et extraits*, II, 83; Thiriet, *Régestes*, III, no. 2568.

144. Setton, *The Papacy*, II, 68-69.

145. Thiriet, *Régestes*, III, nos. 2608, 2628; Setton, *The Papacy*, II, 75, note 131.

146. *Ghazavât*, p. 4.

a peace agreement after a swift and particularly brutal raid into Karaman in the summer of 1443, and then returned to Rumelia in the autumn. The crusaders' army under Ladislas, the Hungarian king, John Hunyadi, voivode of Transylvania, and George Brankovich, despot of Serbia, crossed the Danube at Belgrade early in October, when the Ottoman provincial cavalry had been scattered and returned home. The crusading enthusiasm inspired by Hunyadi led a great number of volunteers to join the regular forces of the Hungarian magnates. The whole army, estimated to consist of 25,000 men, included an important mercenary force hired with funds given by the Serbian despot, and, in addition, a contingent of 8,000 Serbian and 5,000 Polish soldiers. As in 1396, the bulk of the army consisted of Hungarians, which demonstrates the fact that the "crusade" was basically a Hungarian undertaking.

The Ottoman chronicle, *Ghazavât*,<sup>147</sup> clarifies many important points concerning "the long campaign". In explaining the successes of the Christian army, the Ottoman sources in general emphasize the disagreement and lack of coöperation between the Ottoman frontier forces under Turakhan and the sipahi army under Kasim, beglerbeg of Rumelia. These sources are silent, however, on the most important battle of the whole campaign, which took place at Bolvani in the plain of Nish on November 3, 1443. Here the Ottoman forces mustered under Turakhan and Kasim were defeated in their attempt to halt the advance of the crusaders. Pirot and Sofia soon fell and, according to *Ghazavât*, Bulgarians welcoming and helping the invading army elected a "vladika" as their head in Sofia. The sultan, who had been in Sofia, had burned down the city before his retreat. In a letter to the Venetian senate from Sofia dated December 4, 1443, cardinal Cesarini proclaimed the "flight of the sultan".

To protect the Maritsa valley leading to his capital, Adrianople, the sultan fortified all the passes through the Balkan range, and met the crusader army at Zlatitsa pass. Exhausted by cold and hunger, the Christian army was beaten at the battle of Zlatitsa and forced to retreat on December 12, 1443.

In pursuit of the enemy, the sultan fell upon the Christian army at Melshticha near Sofia on December 24.<sup>148</sup> His attack failed mainly because the crusaders sheltered themselves in their camp, surrounded by war-wagons reinforced by guns. It was this tactic which made possible

147. For a comparison of the information supplied by *Ghazavât* with western sources, see my notes in the edition of the work (Ankara, 1978), pp. 94-110.

148. *Ghazavât*, 23-25, states that sultan Murad was present at the battle.

the long retreat under constant attack by the harassing Ottoman forces. On January 2, 1444, at the mountain pass at Kunovitsa, between Pirot and Nish, Hunyadi inflicted a defeat on the pursuing Ottoman army; among the captives was Mahmud, husband of the sultan's sister. The retreating crusader army reached Belgrade on January 25. When he reached Buda safely the king dismounted and went barefoot to the church in gratitude to God. The pope sent a consecrated cap and sword to the king, and throughout Europe the victory was celebrated with great joy and religious fervor. Never before had a Christian army advanced so deep into Ottoman territory. Following the crusade, the Ottoman military structure throughout the Balkans seemed to dissolve as local lords in Ottoman service tried to gain their independence, among them Scanderbeg in Albania and despot Constantine Palaeologus in the Morea. Vlad II Dracul turned against the Ottomans and recognized Hungarian suzerainty, thus impairing the Ottoman position in Bulgaria.

During the summer of 1444 there was panic among the Turks in Rumelia and, as *Ghazavāt* put it, the well-to-do were leaving Rumelia for Anatolia. There, however, the Karamanid Ibrahim Beg had renewed his attack and occupied the territory in dispute in the spring of 1444.

The sultan had made contact with the king of Hungary as early as January 1444, promising to revive the Serbian despotate as a buffer between the two countries.<sup>149</sup> The sultan's wife Mara, George Brankovich's daughter, played an important role in the opening of negotiations in March and April of 1444. Hoping to recover his despotate, Brankovich did everything possible to realize this peace. He attempted to persuade Hunyadi to work for peace by giving up to him his own small domain in Hungary (Vilagos and 120 villages). Actually, Hunyadi agreed to this to gain time to prepare the crusade. "The long campaign" was to be completed in 1444, and the Ottomans driven out of the Balkans. Later, Hunyadi was to be promised the kingdom of Bulgaria. It is obvious that for him "peace" was a war trick.

The Hungarian-Serbian embassy to the sultan concluded a peace treaty in Adrianople on June 12, 1444. The sultan had to agree to the revival of the Serbian despotate, which had been annexed to the Ottoman empire in 1439. The Ottomans even had to surrender Golubats, the principal Ottoman fortress on the Danube since 1427. In return, the king recognized Ottoman rule over Bulgaria. The Hungarians and

149. For the treaty of Adrianople (or Szegedin) and the period between 1443 and 1451 in general, see Inalcik, *Fâtih devri üzerinde tetkikler ve vesikalar* (Ankara, 1954).

the Ottomans both promised not to cross the Danube to attack. The Serbian despot was to remain under the sultan's suzerainty as a tributary prince. Vlad Dracul was included in the peace treaty as an Ottoman tributary prince but under Hungarian protection. The sultan solemnly ratified the treaty by oath in the presence of the ambassadors. In order to take the oaths from the king, the despot, and Hunyadi and to implement the surrender of the fortresses in Serbia to the despot, the sultan sent Balta-oghlu Suleiman<sup>150</sup> to Hungary. By the peace treaty Hungary had attained the objectives it had pursued for decades. Beyond this, any continuation of war would have to be a real crusade to eliminate Ottoman rule in the Balkans and rescue Constantinople.

Already, however, on April 15, 1444, the king had given his oath in the presence of cardinal-legate Cesarini to continue the crusade that summer.<sup>151</sup> But there was strong opposition in Hungary to the continuation of the war. In April the Hungarian diet did not approve the preparations for war. Those in favor of peace gave priority to improvement of internal conditions in Hungary and Poland, while the war party believed in the potential success of a crusade and its advantages for the king's position in Hungary. The pope's legate Cesarini and John de' Reguardati, the Venetian envoy in Buda, vigorously supported the partisans of war. Already, in the winter, the Venetian senate had formally notified the king of its resolution to join the crusade and send a fleet to the Straits to cut off Ottoman communications between Asia and Europe; this fleet left Venice on June 15, 1444. At this point Venice expected the imminent collapse of the Ottoman empire, and planned to occupy Gallipoli, Thessalonica, Albania, and even some ports on the Black Sea. The news of the departure of the fleet reached Hungary in July and definitely had a strong influence on the decision to go to war. In his letter dated July 30, 1444, John VIII Palaeologus told the king that it was the most opportune moment to destroy the Ottomans, since Murad II had crossed over to Anatolia, and that the peace treaty had thus served its real purpose.

Despot Constantine in the Morea promised his military coöperation with the crusaders, and had already taken the offensive. Byzantine diplomacy also appears to have been responsible for the coöperation of the Karamanids with the despot and Hungary.<sup>152</sup> Within the Balkans Scanderbeg and Ghin Zenevisi in Albania, as well as the Albanians and Vlachs in Thessaly, were in rebellion, and king Tvrtko II

150. Later, in 1453, the Ottoman admiral at the siege of Constantinople.

151. See above, note 142.

152. Inalcik, *Fâtiḥ devri*, p. 33.

of Bosnia had recovered Srebrenitsa. All these developments during the summer made the Hungarian court believe that the chances for success of a crusade could not be better at any other time.

Murad II had crossed over to Anatolia against the Karamanids on July 12, 1444, but instead of fighting he signed a peace treaty with them in early August at Yenishehir, giving up the long-disputed area to them. Then, believing he had guaranteed peace in the east and west by eliminating the main issues of conflict with the Hungarians and the Karamanids, he abdicated in favor of his son Mehmed II, then only twelve years old, thus leaving all power in the hands of the grand vizir Chandarli Khalil. A fierce rivalry soon broke out between Khalil and the tutors of the young sultan for power in Adrianople. The Byzantine emperor then released the Ottoman pretender Orkhan, who went to the Dobruja to win over the frontier raiders to his cause. An uprising of the Hurūfī dervishes in Adrianople occurred at the same time, in the summer of 1444. This chaotic state of affairs in the Ottoman empire was used as a further argument by those in the Hungarian capital advocating a crusade.

On August 15, 1444, at Szegedin, by taking the oath in the presence of Balta-oghlu Suleiman, the sultan's ambassador, king Ladislas completed the formal ratification of the treaty concluded in Adrianople on June 12.<sup>153</sup> The king did so upon the insistence of the despot, since otherwise Balta-oghlu would not evacuate and surrender the fortresses in Serbia. On August 4, 1444, while negotiations continued at Szegedin on this key point, the king proclaimed under oath a manifesto to the Christian world about his firm decision to continue war against the Ottomans. The Venetian senate, however, thought this was not a sufficient guarantee, and decided to act cautiously in its relations with the sultan. It can be concluded that Ladislas, and Hunyadi in particular, were determined to continue the war against the Ottomans in 1444, but did not want to jeopardize their diplomatic success of the recovery of the Serbian despotate for the sake of a "formality". Besides, cardinal Cesarini assured the king that an oath sworn to an "infidel" without the pope's approval was not canonically binding, and reminded him of the possibility of excommunication if he violated his solemn promises for the crusade.<sup>154</sup>

The crusaders' army, 16,000 men under Ladislas and Hunyadi, crossed the Danube near Belgrade on September 18-22, 1444. The Serbian

153. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-53; Pall, "Ciriaco d'Ancona," pp. 42-43; *idem*, "Autour de la croisade de Varna," p. 152.

154. Zinkeisen, *Geschichte*, I, 672-674.



despot George Brankovich remained neutral. According to *Ghazavāt* the native Bulgarian peasants again coöperated with the invading army. The Wallachian army, 4,000 to 7,000 strong, under Vlad Dracul, joined the crusaders near Nicopolis. The Christian high command decided to capture Adrianople, the Ottoman capital, without wasting time on the way at the fortresses of Vidin, Nicopolis, Tirnovo, and Provadiya (Pravidi), which put up stiff resistance, while Shumen and Petrich were taken by storm. On November 9 the Christian army besieged and took Varna on the Black Sea, where it was to establish contact with the crusading fleet, which included eight papal, six or eight Venetian, four Burgundian, and two Ragusan galleys.<sup>155</sup> The fleet was not successful in blocking the passage of the Anatolian army under Murad, who was hastily called from Bursa to assume the high command on October 20, 1444.

The Ottoman army forced the crusaders to a pitched battle before Varna on November 10. All passages for possible retreat of the Christian army were intercepted. At the battle, both wings of the Ottoman army were routed, and then Ladislav with his heavy cavalry charged straight on Murad's camp, where the decisive battle took place. The scattered Ottoman cavalry gathered around the sultan's flag and fought back. "When the king," *Ghazavāt* says, "saw that the Christian troops began to scatter in defeat around him, he was panicked and did not know what to do. Although he tried to rearrange his troops he failed. While he was running to and fro alone one of the Ottoman soldiers struck him a strong blow with a mace, which threw him off his horse. The janissaries and azebs crowded around him and struck him with their axes." Ladislav's death was followed by a general debacle of the crusader army. Hunyadi, however, was able to retreat safely, thanks to his *wagenburg* tactics.

There is a consensus that Varna was a turning point in eastern European history. In Poland, those opposing the idea of a crusade against the Ottomans got the upper hand,<sup>156</sup> and Hungary entered another crisis of succession. Now Ottoman control in the Balkans was reestablished more firmly than ever. Murad II resumed the Ottoman throne in 1446 as a result of grand vizir Khalil's maneuvers against his rivals, Zaganuz and Shehābeddin, tutors of the young sultan Mehmed II. In order to reassert Ottoman sovereignty, Murad embarked upon a series of campaigns against despot Constantine in the Morea (autumn 1446) and Scanderbeg in Albania (1448 and 1450). Hunyadi did not give up

155. Setton, *The Papacy*, II, 85-86. On the crusade of Varna see below, chapter VIII.

156. Halecki, *From Florence to Brest* (Rome, 1958), pp. 75-76.

his struggle against the Ottomans after Varna. In 1445, while a Venetian fleet under Alvise Loredan came to watch the Ottomans on the Dardanelles, the Wallachian voivode Vlad Dracul, with the support of Hunyadi, reconquered Giurgiu from the Ottomans, and the following year Vlad defeated an invading army under the frontier beg Davud (spring 1446).

In 1448, when Murad attacked Scanderbeg in Albania, Hunyadi invaded Serbia as far as Kossovo, where a fierce three-day battle ended with Ottoman victory (October 17-20, 1448). In this connection, two points should be made: first, by now the Ottomans had learned *wagenburg* (in Turkish *tabur-jengi*) tactics and increased their firepower. Second, since the 1444 agreement of Yenishehir the Karamanids had co-operated with the Ottomans; a Karamanid contingent fought against the Hungarians at Kossovo in 1448. Also, in this period, a sense of solidarity and friendship ruled the relations between the Ottomans and the Mamluks, who were both threatened by the Timurid Shāhrukh and by the crusaders. The Mamluks, suzerains of the kings of Cyprus since 1426, tried unsuccessfully to subjugate the Hospitallers of Rhodes by sending a fleet against the island in the summer of 1444.

Perhaps most important of all, the defeat at Varna sealed the fate of Byzantium. The union of the churches and the idea of the crusade suffered a deep setback in all the Graeco-Slavic world. The Greeks and other Balkan peoples accommodated themselves to the idea of living under an Islamic state rather than under the Catholic Venetians and Hungarians. It should be added that by this time the Ottoman state was fully transformed into a classic Islamic sultanate with all its underpinnings, and that an actual social revolution was introduced into the Balkans by a state policy efficiently protecting the peasantry against local exploitation and the dominance of feudal lords and extending an agrarian system based on state ownership of land and its utilization in small farms in the possession of peasant households. As early as 1432, Bertrandon of La Brocquière, a Burgundian spy, had observed that Murad II had immense resources in his hands with which to conquer Europe if he wished to do so.<sup>157</sup>

157. *Le Voyage d'Outremer* (Belgrade, 1950), p. 110: "s'il vouloit exquiter la puissance qu'il a et sa grant revenue, veu la petite résistance qu'il treuve en la crestienté, ce seroit à luy légierie chose à en conquister une grant partie."